Bankruptcy Law, Creditors’ Rights and Contractual Exchange in Europe, 1808–1914
Recent historical research on bankruptcy has been centred almost exclusively on Common law countries, especially the United States. The consequence is that the research agenda includes issues which may, or may not, have broader relevance. This paper is an attempt at including within a larger historical and comparative perspective the evolution observed in continental Europe, during the 19th century. A data set has thus been assembled which includes the main features of a total of 51 codes or statutes, in 15 countries of all legal traditions. An early conclusion is that all these laws defended strongly creditors’ rights during bankruptcy, during the whole period under review. This goes against the thesis defended i.a. by La Porta et alii (1998) which state that “legal origins” have a strong, differentiated effect on property and creditors’ rights, which would be permanent over history. Two dimensions are then analysed. First, the status of the failed debtor, and whether he was subjected to repression; second, the degree to which the law supported or not the attempts of the parties to negotiate a composition, or continuation arrangement. An early period witnessed repressive, highly regulated frameworks: the paradigm is the Napoleonic, 1808 Code de commerce, though its main features were still highly visible half a century latter, in almost all countries. Then emerged a liberal model, between 1865 and 1885 with again a fair degree of convergence: the personal and civic fate of the debtor became much more immune to commercial failure; and the parties get more autonomy to bargain, though a bifurcation emerged between a “menu approach” to re-negotiation in England and in the French law countries, and a “single-option” procedure in German law countries. Beyond, it is proposed that these broad trends reflect the growing capacity of the institutional environment to reduce risks of moral hazards, and more generally transaction costs. By the end of the century, bargaining on bankruptcy had become easier and safer, so that judicial guarantees could be eased.
|Date of creation:||01 May 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +43/1/404 20 7205
Fax: +43/1/404 20 7299
Web page: http://www.oenb.at/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Postal: Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Economic Studies Division, c/o Beate Hofbauer-Berlakovich, POB 61, A-1011 Vienna, Austria|
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marco Pagano & Paolo F. Volpin, 2005.
"The Political Economy of Corporate Governance,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1005-1030, September.
- Pagano, Marco & Volpin, Paolo, 2001. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2682, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marco Pagano & Paolo Volpin, 1999. "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance," CSEF Working Papers 29, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, revised 01 Jul 2005.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997.
"Legal Determinants of External Finance,"
NBER Working Papers
5879, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Working Paper 19443, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1788, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- RAFAEL LaPORTA & FLORENCIO LOPEZ-de-SILANES & ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. VISHNY, . "Legal Determinants of External Finance,"," CRSP working papers 324, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
- Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silane & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996.
"Law and Finance,"
NBER Working Papers
5661, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W., 1998. "Law and Finance," Scholarly Articles 3451310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "Law and Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1768, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, . "Law and Finance," Working Paper 19451, Harvard University OpenScholar.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:onb:oenbwp:109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Markus Knell and Helmut Stix)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.