IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/oml/wpaper/202003.html

Optimal regulatory policies for charging of electric vehicles

Author

Listed:
  • Mads Greaker

    (Oslo Business School - OsloMet)

Abstract

Electric vehicles (EVs) and their associated charging stations are characterized by indirect network effects. Indirect network effects may imply too slow adoption of a new good that improves welfare. Today, there are at four standards for high-speed charging in Europe. We find that policies should seek to standardize high-speed charging systems as this will unambiguously mean faster phase-in of EVs and improve welfare. We also find that governments should subsidize both the charging at each station and the entry of charging stations. The subsidies should cover a share of the private variable charging cost and the private fixed entry cost. Furthermore, the formula for setting the shares of costs to be paid by the regulator turns out to be very simple; the regulator only has to observe the percentage markup on the charging price, and can calculate the optimal share directly from that.

Suggested Citation

  • Mads Greaker, 2020. "Optimal regulatory policies for charging of electric vehicles," Working Papers 202003, Oslo Metropolitan University, Oslo Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:oml:wpaper:202003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12199/6421
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, 1985. "Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(1), pages 70-83, Spring.
    2. Corts, Kenneth S., 2010. "Building out alternative fuel retail infrastructure: Government fleet spillovers in E85," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 219-234, May.
    3. Daziano, Ricardo A., 2013. "Conditional-logit Bayes estimators for consumer valuation of electric vehicle driving range," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 429-450.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Fabrizio, Kira R. & Hawn, Olga, 2013. "Enabling diffusion: How complementary inputs moderate the response to environmental policy," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(5), pages 1099-1111.
    2. Scott K. Shriver, 2015. "Network Effects in Alternative Fuel Adoption: Empirical Analysis of the Market for Ethanol," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(1), pages 78-97, January.
    3. María Fernanda Viecens, 2009. "Compatibility with Firm Dominance," Working Papers 2009-12, FEDEA.
    4. Raphaël Soubeyran, 2019. "Technology adoption and pro-social preferences," CEE-M Working Papers halshs-02291905, CEE-M, Universtiy of Montpellier, CNRS, INRA, Montpellier SupAgro.
    5. Feng, Yao, 2011. "Local spillovers and learning from neighbors: Evidence from durable adoptions in rural China," MPRA Paper 33924, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Ito, Nobuyuki & Takeuchi, Kenji & Managi, Shunsuke, 2019. "Do battery-switching systems accelerate the adoption of electric vehicles? A stated preference study," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 85-92.
    7. Mileva, Elitza & Siegfried, Nikolaus, 2012. "Oil market structure, network effects and the choice of currency for oil invoicing," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 385-394.
    8. Howell, Bronwyn, 2006. "Unveiling 'Invisible Hands': Two-Sided Platforms in Health Care Markets," Working Paper Series 18936, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    9. Ostrizek, Franz & Sartori, Elia, 2023. "Screening while controlling an externality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 26-55.
    10. Burani, Nadia & Mantovani, Andrea, 2025. "Environmental policies with green network effect and price discrimination," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 235(C).
    11. Ciccotello, Conrad S & Hornyak, Martin J & Piwowar, Michael S, 2004. "Research and Development Alliances: Evidence from a Federal Contracts Repository," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 47(1), pages 123-166, April.
    12. Jullien, Bruno, 2001. "Competing with Network Externalities and Price Discrimination," CEPR Discussion Papers 2883, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Howell, Bronwyn, 2006. "Unveiling 'Invisible Hands': Two-Sided Platforms in Health Care Markets," Working Paper Series 3841, Victoria University of Wellington, The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation.
    14. Chegut, Andrea & Eichholtz, Piet & Kok, Nils, 2019. "The price of innovation: An analysis of the marginal cost of green buildings," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 98(C).
    15. Shy, O. & Chou, C-F., 1990. "Do Consumers Always Gain When More People Buy The Same Brand?," Papers 40-90, Tel Aviv.
    16. Hahn, Jong-Hee, 2003. "Nonlinear pricing of telecommunications with call and network externalities," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 949-967, September.
    17. Karen Ruckman & Nilesh Saraf & Vallabh Sambamurthy, 2015. "Market Positioning by IT Service Vendors Through Imitation," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 26(1), pages 100-126, March.
    18. Heijmans, Roweno J.R.K. & Suetens, Sigrid, 2025. "Comparing Subsidies to Solve Coordination Failure," Discussion Papers 2025/9, Norwegian School of Economics, Department of Business and Management Science.
    19. Snellman, Heli, 2006. "Automated teller machine network market structure and cash usage," Bank of Finland Scientific Monographs, Bank of Finland, volume 0, number sm2006_038, December.
    20. Alexandre Belloni & Changrong Deng & Saša Pekeč, 2017. "Mechanism and Network Design with Private Negative Externalities," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 65(3), pages 577-594, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    ;
    ;
    ;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oml:wpaper:202003. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Eirik Hanssen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ohioano.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.