IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ohe/briefg/002055.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Private Provision of Publicly Funded Health Care: The Economics of Ownership

Author

Listed:
  • Chalkley, M.
  • Sussex, J.

Abstract

There are strongly stated concerns regarding the increasing use of non-publicly owned, especially for-profit, firms to provide services - concerns that the NHS is being undermined, that future services will be at risk or even that health care that is free at the point of delivery – a key tenet of the NHS – is about to be abandoned. There are, however, also staunch defenders of the role of the private sector in health care who argue that private providers increase patient choice, reduce waiting times and drive innovation and efficiency improvements. Depending on the viewpoint, private ownership is either a disaster or a salvation for the NHS. This OHE Briefing outlines the NHS ownership debate through the lens of economics. The aim of the Briefing is to improve understanding of how economics can or cannot help to resolve the question of whether the private ownership of health care provision is good or bad. The economics literature that informs this overview includes - the theory of the organisation of production; theories of behaviour and motivation and the role of incentives and payments in influencing decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Chalkley, M. & Sussex, J., 2018. "Private Provision of Publicly Funded Health Care: The Economics of Ownership," Briefings 002055, Office of Health Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ohe:briefg:002055
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.ohe.org/system/files/private/publications/OHE%20Briefing%20-%20Economics%20of%20Ownership_0.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2008. "Contracts as reference points � experimental evidence," IEW - Working Papers 393, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
    3. Ernst Fehr & Oliver Hart & Christian Zehnder, 2011. "Contracts as Reference Points--Experimental Evidence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 493-525, April.
    4. Pérotin, Virginie & Zamora, Bernarda & Reeves, Rachel & Bartlett, Will & Allen, Pauline, 2013. "Does hospital ownership affect patient experience? An investigation into public–private sector differences in England," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 633-646.
    5. repec:eee:jeborg:v:153:y:2018:i:c:p:322-344 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Moscelli, Giuseppe & Gravelle, Hugh & Siciliani, Luigi & Gutacker, Nils, 2018. "The effect of hospital ownership on quality of care: Evidence from England," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 322-344.
    7. Martine Marie Bellanger & Philippe Mossé, 2005. "The search for the holy Grail : combining decentralised planning and contracting mechanisms in the French health care system," Post-Print halshs-00551874, HAL.
    8. Gian Paolo Barbetta & Gilberto Turati & Angelo M. Zago, 2007. "Behavioral differences between public and private not-for-profit hospitals in the Italian national health service," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(1), pages 75-96.
    9. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2007. "Incomplete Contracts and Ownership: Some New thoughts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 182-186, May.
    10. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
    11. Yasuo Sanjo, 2009. "Quality choice in a health care market: a mixed duopoly approach," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 10(2), pages 207-215, May.
    12. Martine M. Bellanger & Philippe R. Mossé, 2005. "The search for the Holy Grail: combining decentralised planning and contracting mechanisms in the French health care system," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(S1), pages 119-132.
    13. repec:ohe:monogr:000450 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Wim Biesen & Norbert Lameire & Patrick Peeters & Raymond Vanholder, 2007. "Belgium’s mixed private/public health care system and its impact on the cost of end-stage renal disease," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 133-148, September.
    15. Luigi Siciliani & Peter Sivey & Andrew Street, 2013. "Differences In Length Of Stay For Hip Replacement Between Public Hospitals, Specialised Treatment Centres And Private Providers: Selection Or Efficiency?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(2), pages 234-242, February.
    16. repec:ohe:monogr:000168 is not listed on IDEAS
    17. Midttun, Linda & Hagen, Terje P., 2006. "The private public mix of healthcare: evidence from a decentralised NHS country," Health Economics, Policy and Law, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(03), pages 277-298, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentivising quality;

    JEL classification:

    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ohe:briefg:002055. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Publications Manager). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/ohecouk.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.