Market Penetration and Late Entry in Mobile Telephony
We consider some two dynamic models of entry in mobile telephony, with and without strategic pricing, and taking into account market penetration at entry, locked-in consumers and tariff-mediated network externalities. We show that on/off-net differentials may reduce the possibility of entry if incumbents are large, while they have no long-run effects if there are no locked-in consumers, or reduce the difference in subscriber numbers in their presence. Asymmetric fixed-to-mobile or mobile-to-mobile termination rates increase (decrease) market share and profit of the network with the higher (lower) rate. While the fixed-to-mobile waterbed effect is not full at the network level, it will be full in the aggregate.
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