Asymmetric Regulation of Access and Price Discrimination in Telecommunications
Suppose that a strong and a weak operator compete in a telecommunications market. To terminate a call operators need access to the competitor’s network if the call is off-net. Operators set two-part tariffs and price-discriminate according to termination of a call. Suppose as a benchmark that access prices are regulated at costs. I show that the weak operator’s profit and consumer welfare increase if the regulator sets a higher price to access the weak operator’s network. However, total surplus decreases even locally. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005
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- Ingo Vogelsang, 2003. "Price Regulation of Access to Telecommunications Networks," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 41(3), pages 830-862, September.
- Peitz, Martin, 2005. "Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 341-358, February.
- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-77, November.
- Armstrong, Mark, 2004. "Network interconnection with asymmetric networks and heterogeneous calling patterns," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 375-390, September.
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