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More about this item
KeywordsAMD; complementors; complements; co-opetition; equilibrium non-existence; installed base; Intel; Microsoft; pricing.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
- M21 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Economics - - - Business Economics
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2007-11-24 (Business Economics)
- NEP-COM-2007-11-24 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2007-11-24 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-LAW-2007-11-24 (Law & Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2007-11-24 (Microeconomics)
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