The entry incentives of complementary producers: A simple model with implications for antitrust policy
We model competition between two firms in an upstream-downstream relationship. Each firm can pay a sunk cost to enter the other's market. We show that coordination (e.g., through merger) can be anticompetitive, and that such coordination can arise in equilibrium.
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