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The exclusion of competing one-way essential complements: implications for net neutrality

Author

Listed:
  • Sébastien BROOS
  • Axel GAUTIER

Abstract

We analyze the incentives of internet service providers (ISPs) to break net neutrality by excluding competing one-way essential complements, i.e. internet applications competing with their own products. A typical example is the exclusion of VoIP applications by telecom companies offering internet and voice services. A monopoly ISP may want to exclude a competing internet app if it is of inferior quality and the ISP cannot ask for a surcharge for its use. Competition between ISPs never leads to full app exclusion but it may lead to a fragmented internet where only one ISP offers the application. We show that, both in monopoly and duopoly, prohibiting the exclusion of the app and surcharges for its use does not always improve welfare.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Sébastien BROOS & Axel GAUTIER, 2017. "The exclusion of competing one-way essential complements: implications for net neutrality," LIDAM Reprints CORE 2842, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:2842
    Note: In : International Journal of Industrial Organization, 52, 358-332, 2017
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    Cited by:

    1. Robert F. Easley & Hong Guo & Jan Krämer, 2018. "Research Commentary—From Net Neutrality to Data Neutrality: A Techno-Economic Framework and Research Agenda," Information Systems Research, INFORMS, vol. 29(2), pages 253-272, June.
    2. Marc Bourreau & Romain Lestage, 2019. "Net neutrality and asymmetric platform competition," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 140-171, April.
    3. Gautier, Axel & Somogyi, Robert, 2020. "Prioritization vs zero-rating: Discrimination on the internet," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    4. Vogelsang Ingo, 2018. "Net Neutrality Regulation: Much Ado about Nothing?," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 225-243, September.
    5. Jan Krämer, & Daniel Schnurr,, 2018. "Is there a need for platform neutrality regulation in the EU?," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 42(7), pages 514-529.
    6. Edmond Baranes & Cuong Hung Vuong, 2022. "Investment in quality upgrade and regulation of the internet," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 1-31, February.
    7. Jamison Mark A., 2018. "Net Neutrality Policies and Regulation in the United States," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 17(3), pages 151-173, September.
    8. Szabó, Andrea & Pham, Vinh, 2022. "Net neutrality and consumer demand in the video on-demand market," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    9. Calzada, Joan & Tselekounis, Markos, 2018. "Net Neutrality in a hyperlinked Internet economy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 190-221.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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