Implementing Free Trade Areas: Rules of Origin and Hidden Protection
This paper focuses on the effects of rules of origin in Free Trade Areas. We first point out that even rules of origin which are not restrictive, namely those which do not raise costs of production, have very pronounced effects on trade and investment flows. We then look at some different ways of specifying rules of origin (ROOs) under perfect competition. We compare price and cost based ROOs and show that even if they are equivalent in the 'long run', they are not equivalent in the short run where capacity constraints can exist. We also show that some kinds of ROOs can be ranked in terms of their implications for producer profits. We also show that welfare is likely to be non monotonic in the restrictiveness of the ROO, so that making a ROO more stringent could raise welfare. Finally, we show that in the presence of imperfect competition, ROOs may raise output and reduce prices as they become more stringent.
|Date of creation:||Jan 1995|
|Publication status:||published as New Directions in Trade Theory, J. Levinsohn, A. Deardorff and R. Sterneds., (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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- Hollander, Abraham, 1987. "Content protection and transnational monopoly," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 23(3-4), pages 283-297, November. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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