Conditional Policies in General Equilibrium
Obtaining lower generalized system of preferences (GSP) tariffs requires meeting costly Rules of Origin (ROOs). Growing coffee in the shade is more costly, but yields a price premium. This paper analyzes the effects of such restrictions in a general equilibrium setting and shows that such policies may have unanticipated effects. It is shown that in a world with capital mobility, the GSP could result in capital outflows rather than inflows and consumer preferences for shade grown coffee end up hurting labor in developing countries. Even small subsidies that are contingent on the use of domestic intermediates can result in specialization in the targeted good. Value added contingent policies can easily lead to multiple equilibria despite the absence of externalities or market imperfections.
|Date of creation:||May 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Kala Krishna, 2015. "Conditional Policies in General Equilibrium," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(4), pages 797-819, November.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dyck, Alexander & Zingales, Luigi, 2002.
"The Corporate Governance Role of the Media,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3630, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Kala Krishna & Motoshige Itoh, 1988.
"Content Protection and Oligopolistic Interactions,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 55(1), pages 107-125.
- Jiandong Ju & Kala Krishna, 1998.
"Firm Behavior and Market Access in a Free Trade Area with Rules of Origin,"
NBER Working Papers
6857, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Jiandong Ju & Kala Krishna, 2005. "Firm behaviour and market access in a Free Trade Area with rules of origin," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 38(1), pages 290-308, February.
- Eugene Beaulieu & James Gaisford, 2002. "Labour and Environmental Standards: The 'Lemons Problem' in International Trade Policy," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(1), pages 59-78, 01.
- Kala Krishna & Anne Krueger, 1995. "Implementing Free Trade Areas: Rules of Origin and Hidden Protection," NBER Working Papers 4983, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Michael L. Mussa, 1984. "The Economics of Content Protection," NBER Working Papers 1457, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ju, Jiandong & Krishna, Kala, 2002. "Regulations, regime switches and non-monotonicity when non-compliance is an option: an application to content protection and preference," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 315-321, November.
- Richardson, Martin, 1995. "Tariff revenue competition in a free trade area," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1429-1437, August.
- McCulloch, Rachel & Johnson, Harry G, 1973. "A Note on Proportionally Distributed Quotas," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(4), pages 726-32, September.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11283. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.