IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

What Are EU Trade Preferences Worth for Sub-Saharan Africa and Other Developing Countries?

  • Candau, Fabien
  • Jean, Sebastien

This study shows that EU preferences to developing countries were fairly well utilised in 2001, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. For several sub-Saharan African countries, the value of EU tariff preferences, even without accounting for tariff rate quota rents, is worth a significant proportion of their world exports. For non-African Least Developed Countries, in contrast, we find that the EBA initiative was only half-utilised approximately, although it is the only preferential regime available to most of them. It is difficult to reach a firm conclusion since 2001 was the first year of enforcement of Everything But Arms (EBA), and figures for 2002 show utilisation is on the rise, but rules of origin appear to limit significantly the value of this scheme. This also likely explains why the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) scheme is significantly under-utilised in the manufacturing sector, even when the receiving country is not eligible to any other preferential regime.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18863
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by TRADEAG - Agricultural Trade Agreements in its series Working Papers with number 18863.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Handle: RePEc:ags:tragwp:18863
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://tradeag.vitamib.com/

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Paul Brenton & Miriam Manchin, 2002. "Making EU Trade Agreements Work: The Role of Rules of Origin," wiiw Balkan Observatory Working Papers 27, The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, wiiw.
  2. Sapir, Andre, 1998. "The political economy of EC regionalism," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 717-732, May.
  3. Pascal Lamy, 2002. "Stepping Stones or Stumbling Blocks? The EU's Approach Towards the Problem of Multilateralism vs Regionalism in Trade Policy," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(10), pages 1399-1413, November.
  4. Mattoo, Aaditya & Roy, Devesh & Subramanian, Arvind, 2002. "The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and its rules of origin : generosity undermined?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2908, The World Bank.
  5. Jiandong Ju & Kala Krishna, 1998. "Firm Behavior and Market Access in a Free Trade Area with Rules of Origin," NBER Working Papers 6857, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Kala Krishna & Anne Krueger, 1995. "Implementing Free Trade Areas: Rules of Origin and Hidden Protection," NBER Working Papers 4983, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  7. Kala Krishna, 2005. "Understanding Rules of Origin," NBER Working Papers 11150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Ju, Jiandong & Krishna, Kala, 2002. "Regulations, regime switches and non-monotonicity when non-compliance is an option: an application to content protection and preference," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 77(3), pages 315-321, November.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ags:tragwp:18863. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (AgEcon Search)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.