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Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market For Pharmaceuticals

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  • Richard G. Frank
  • David S. Salkever

Abstract

Empirical studies suggest that entry of generic competitors results in minimal decreases or even increases in brand-name drug prices as well as sharp declines in brand-name advertising. This paper examines circumstances under which this empirical pattern could be observed. The analysis focuses on models where the demand for brand-name pharmaceuticals is divided into two segments, only one of which is cross-price-sensitive. Brand-name firms are assumed to set price and advertising in a Stackelberg context; they allow for responses by generic producers but the latter take decisions by brand-name f inns as given. Brand-name price and advertising responses to entry are shown to depend upon the properties of the reduced-form brand-name demand function. Conditions for positive price responses and negative advertising responses are derived. We also examine the implications for brand-name price levels, and for the brand-name price response to entry, of health sector trends (such as increasing HMO enrollments) that may have the effect of expanding the size of the cross-price-sensitive segment of the market. The paper concludes with a review of recent empirical research and suggestions for future work on the effects of generic entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, 1991. "Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market For Pharmaceuticals," NBER Working Papers 3803, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3803
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Elamin H. Elbasha, 2003. "Deadweight loss of bacterial resistance due to overtreatment," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 125-138, February.
    2. Philipp N. Baecker, 2007. "Real Options and Intellectual Property," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, Springer, number 978-3-540-48264-2, December.
    3. Joan Costa-Font, 2016. "Is medicines parallel trade ‘regulatory arbitrage’?," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 321-336, December.
    4. Stéphane Jacobzone, 1998. "Le rôle des prix dans la régulation du secteur pharmaceutique," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 312(1), pages 35-53.
    5. Chatterjee, Chirantan & Gupta, Samarth, 2024. "Public entry and private prices: New evidence from Indian pharmaceutical markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 473-489.
    6. Yusuf, Patience, 2020. "Impact of Government Health Expenditure on Economic Growth in Nigeria 1981 - 2016," AfricArxiv uegxf, Center for Open Science.
    7. Atanu Saha & Henry Grabowski & Howard Birnbaum & Paul Greenberg & Oded Bizan, 2006. "Generic Competition in the US Pharmaceutical Industry," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 15-38.
    8. Ying Kong, 2004. "The price premium of generic to brand-names and pharmaceutical price index," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(7), pages 731-737.
    9. Stéphane Jacobzonne & Edouard Martin & Vincent Perrin & Julien Werle, 1997. "Une approche hedonique de la formation des prix des médicaments remboursables," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 129(3), pages 73-99.
    10. Judith K. Hellerstein, 1994. "The Demand for Post-Patent Prescription Pharmaceuticals," NBER Working Papers 4981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Janssen, Aljoscha, 2020. "Price Dynamics of Swedish Pharmaceuticals," Working Paper Series 1325, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    12. Mark Duggan & Fiona M. Scott Morton, 2006. "The Distortionary Effects of Government Procurement: Evidence from Medicaid Prescription Drug Purchasing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 121(1), pages 1-30.
    13. Costa-Font, Joan & Rudisill, Caroline & Tan, Stefanie, 2014. "Brand loyalty, patients and limited generic medicines uptake," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 224-233.

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