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Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market For Pharmaceuticals

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  • Richard G. Frank
  • David S. Salkever

Abstract

Empirical studies suggest that entry of generic competitors results in minimal decreases or even increases in brand-name drug prices as well as sharp declines in brand-name advertising. This paper examines circumstances under which this empirical pattern could be observed. The analysis focuses on models where the demand for brand-name pharmaceuticals is divided into two segments, only one of which is cross-price-sensitive. Brand-name firms are assumed to set price and advertising in a Stackelberg context; they allow for responses by generic producers but the latter take decisions by brand-name f inns as given. Brand-name price and advertising responses to entry are shown to depend upon the properties of the reduced-form brand-name demand function. Conditions for positive price responses and negative advertising responses are derived. We also examine the implications for brand-name price levels, and for the brand-name price response to entry, of health sector trends (such as increasing HMO enrollments) that may have the effect of expanding the size of the cross-price-sensitive segment of the market. The paper concludes with a review of recent empirical research and suggestions for future work on the effects of generic entry.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard G. Frank & David S. Salkever, 1991. "Pricing, Patent Loss and the Market For Pharmaceuticals," NBER Working Papers 3803, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3803
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1982. "Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(2), pages 443-459, March.
    2. Ernst R. Berndt & Zvi Griliches & Joshua G. Rosett, 1990. "On the Accuracy of Producer Price Indexes for Pharmaceutical Preparations: An Audit Based on Detailed Firm-Specific Data," NBER Working Papers 3490, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "Persuasion or Information? The Economics of Prescription Drug Advertising," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(1), pages 45-74, April.
    4. Schmalensee, Richard, 1982. "Product Differentiation Advantages of Pioneering Brands," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(3), pages 349-365, June.
    5. Meir Statman, 1981. "The effect of patent expiration on the market position of drugs," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 2(2), pages 61-66, June.
    6. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1980. "A Model in Which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1575-1579, September.
    7. Dranove, David, 1989. "Medicaid Drug Formulary Restrictions," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(1), pages 143-162, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stéphane Jacobzone, 1998. "Le rôle des prix dans la régulation du secteur pharmaceutique," Économie et Statistique, Programme National Persée, vol. 312(1), pages 35-53.
    2. Atanu Saha & Henry Grabowski & Howard Birnbaum & Paul Greenberg & Oded Bizan, 2006. "Generic Competition in the US Pharmaceutical Industry," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(1), pages 15-38.
    3. Ying Kong, 2004. "The price premium of generic to brand-names and pharmaceutical price index," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(7), pages 731-737.
    4. Alka Chadha & Åke Blomqvist, 2005. "Patent Races, “Me-Too” Drugs, and Generics: A Developing-World Perspective," Departmental Working Papers wp0513, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics.
    5. Joan Costa-Font, 2016. "Is medicines parallel trade ‘regulatory arbitrage’?," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 16(4), pages 321-336, December.
    6. Judith K. Hellerstein, 1994. "The Demand for Post-Patent Prescription Pharmaceuticals," NBER Working Papers 4981, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Mark Duggan & Fiona M. Scott Morton, 2006. "The Distortionary Effects of Government Procurement: Evidence from Medicaid Prescription Drug Purchasing," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 121(1), pages 1-30.
    8. Costa-Font, Joan & Rudisill, Caroline & Tan, Stefanie, 2014. "Brand loyalty, patients and limited generic medicines uptake," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 224-233.

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