Sanctions
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Note: ITI IFM
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Eaton, Jonathan & Engers, Maxim, 1992. "Sanctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(5), pages 899-928, October.
- Eaton, J. & Engers, M., 1990. "Sanctions," ISER Discussion Paper 0221, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
- Jonathan Eaton & Maxim Engers, 1993. "Sanctions," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 14, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
References listed on IDEAS
- Rubinstein, Ariel, 1982.
"Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(1), pages 97-109, January.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000387, David K. Levine.
- Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
- Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989.
"Renegotiation in repeated games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
- Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9wv3h5jb, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Joseph Farrell and Eric Maskin., 1987. "Renegotiation in Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8759, University of California at Berkeley.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989.
"A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
- Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1986. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 2088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1988. "A Constant Recontracting Model Of Sovereign Debt," SSRI Workshop Series 292692, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Scholarly Articles 12491028, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Bulow, Jeremy A. & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1986. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Working Papers 43, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
- Fernandez, Raquel & Glazer, Jacob, 1991.
"Striking for a Bargain between Two Completely Informed Agents,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 240-252, March.
- Raquel Fernandez & Jacob Glazer, 1989. "Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents," NBER Working Papers 3108, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- R. M. Cyert & M. H. DeGroot, 1970. "Multiperiod Decision Models with Alternating Choice as a Solution to the Duopoly Problem," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 410-429.
- Ross, Stephen A, 1973. "The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 63(2), pages 134-139, May.
- Eaton, Jonathan & Engers, Maxim, 1990. "Intertemporal Price Competition," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(3), pages 637-659, May.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Brian D. Wright & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 2000.
"Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 621-639, June.
- Kenneth M. Kletzer and Brian D. Wright., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C98-100, University of California at Berkeley.
- Kenneth M. Kletzer & Brian D. Wright, 2000. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," International Finance 0003004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Kletzer, Kenneth M. & Wright, Brian D., 1998. "Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series qt4qg3c42v, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Maxim Engers & Jonathan Eaton, 1999. "Sanctions: Some Simple Analytics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(2), pages 409-414, May.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Houba, H., 1992. "Non-cooperative bargaining in infinitely repeated games with binding contracts," Serie Research Memoranda 0009, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics.
- Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 2001.
"Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 377-411, March.
- Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998. "Costly bargaining and renegotiation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3592, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1999. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation," CESifo Working Paper Series 213, CESifo.
- Robert Shum, 2014. "China, the United States, bargaining, and climate change," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 83-100, March.
- Lucy White & Mark Williams, 2009. "Bargaining with imperfect enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 40(2), pages 317-339, June.
- Weinberger, Catherine J., 2000. "Selective Acceptance and Inefficiency in a Two-Issue Complete Information Bargaining Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 262-293, May.
- Houba, Harold, 1997. "The policy bargaining model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-27, August.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Bargaining and Renegotiation - (Now published in Econometrica, 69(4) (March 2001), pp. 377-411.)," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 361, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Agnieszka Rusinowska & Ahmet Ozkardas, 2015.
"On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time,"
Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(2), pages 181-199, October.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00971403, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01044870, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-01044870, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Post-Print halshs-00971403, HAL.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2014. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 14011, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Ahmet Ozkardas & Agnieszka Rusinowska, 2015. "On equilibrium payoffs in wage bargaining with discount rates varying in time," Post-Print hal-01044870, HAL.
- Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2006. "Different time preferences and non-stationary contracts in negotiations," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 273-279, May.
- Manzini, Paola, 1999.
"Strategic bargaining with destructive power,"
Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 315-322, December.
- Manzini, Paola, 1996. "Strategic bargaining with destructive power," Discussion Papers 9619, University of Exeter, Department of Economics.
- Paola Manzini, 1996. "Strategic bargaining with destructive power," Game Theory and Information 9612002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2014. "Backward induction and unacceptable offers," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 151-156.
- Sergi Jiménez-Martín & Jaume Garcia, 2010.
"Initial offers and outcomes in wage bargaining: who wins?,"
Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 815-846, December.
- Jaume Garcia, & Sergi Jiménez-Martín, 2007. "Initial Offers and Outcomes in Wage Barganing: Who Wins?," Working Papers 2007-22, FEDEA.
- Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Ineficiencias en las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados," Working Papers. Serie EC 1997-03, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- David Nickerson & Asha Sadanand & Venkatraman Sadanand, 1994. "Strategic delay and endogenous offers in bargaining games with private information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 60(2), pages 125-154, June.
- Der‐Yuan Yang, 1999. "A Cooperative Perspective On Sovereign Debt: Past And Present," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 17(1), pages 44-53, January.
- Staiger, Robert W., 1995.
"International rules and institutions for trade policy,"
Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 29, pages 1495-1551,
Elsevier.
- Staiger, Robert W., 1994. "International Rules And Institutions For Trade Policy," SSRI Workshop Series 292708, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute.
- Robert W. Staiger, 1994. "International Rules and Institutions for Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 4962, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, 2023.
"Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On,"
Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 179(3-4), pages 470-499.
- W. Bentley MacLeod & James Malcomson, 2023. "Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment: thirty years on," Economics Series Working Papers 997, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
- MacLeod, W. Bentley & Malcomson, James, 2023. "Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On," IZA Discussion Papers 15881, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Paul R. Krugman, 1989.
"Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors,"
NBER Chapters, in: Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, pages 285-298,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul R. Krugman, 1989. "Private Capital Flows to Problem Debtors," NBER Chapters, in: Developing Country Debt and Economic Performance, Volume 1: The International Financial System, pages 299-330, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989.
"A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-178, February.
- Bulow, Jeremy A. & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1986. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Working Papers 43, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth S., 1989. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," Scholarly Articles 12491028, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1986. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 2088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1988. "A Constant Recontracting Model Of Sovereign Debt," SSRI Workshop Series 292692, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Social Systems Research Institute.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, "undated".
"Costly Coasian Contracts,"
Penn CARESS Working Papers
c5b2efc4326ca8bb8162440d6, Penn Economics Department.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1996. "Costly Coasian Contracts," Game Theory and Information 9610006, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 16 Jan 1997.
- Anderlini, L. & Felli, L., 1997. "Costly Coasian Contracts," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 9704, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 1998. "Costly Coasian Contracts," STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series 362, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE.
- Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, "undated". ""Costly Coasian Contracts''," CARESS Working Papres 97-11, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Anderlini, Luca & Felli, Leonardo, 1998. "Costly coasian contracts," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 3583, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:3399. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/nberrus.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.