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Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System

Author

Listed:
  • Charles W. Calomiris
  • Matthew Jaremski
  • Haelim Park
  • Gary Richardson

Abstract

Reducing systemic liquidity risk related to seasonal swings in loan demand was one reason for the founding of the Federal Reserve System. Existing evidence on the post-Federal Reserve increase in the seasonal volatility of aggregate lending and the decrease in seasonal interest rate swings suggests that it succeeded in that mission. Nevertheless, less than 8 percent of state-chartered banks joined the Federal Reserve in its first decade. Some have speculated that nonmembers could avoid higher costs of the Federal Reserve’s reserve requirements while still obtaining access indirectly to the Federal Reserve discount window through contacts with Federal Reserve members. We find that individual bank attributes related to the extent of banks’ ability to mitigate seasonal loan demand variation predict banks’ decisions to join the Federal Reserve. Consistent with the notion that banks could obtain indirect access to the discount window through interbank transfers, we find that a bank’s position within the interbank network (as a user or provider of liquidity) predicts the timing of its entry into the Federal Reserve System and the effect of Federal Reserve membership on its lending behavior. We also find that indirect access to the Federal Reserve was not as good as direct access. Federal Reserve member banks saw a greater increase in lending than nonmember banks.

Suggested Citation

  • Charles W. Calomiris & Matthew Jaremski & Haelim Park & Gary Richardson, 2015. "Liquidity Risk, Bank Networks, and the Value of Joining the Federal Reserve System," NBER Working Papers 21684, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:21684
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John A. James & David F. Weiman, 2010. "From Drafts to Checks: The Evolution of Correspondent Banking Networks and the Formation of the Modern U.S. Payments System, 1850-1914," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(2-3), pages 237-265, March.
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    3. Charles W. Calomiris & Stephen H. Haber, 2015. "Fragile by Design: The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 10177-2, December.
    4. Gary Richardson & William Troost, 2009. "Monetary Intervention Mitigated Banking Panics during the Great Depression: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from a Federal Reserve District Border, 1929-1933," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(6), pages 1031-1073, December.
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    10. Bernstein, Asaf & Hughson, Eric & Weidenmier, Marc D., 2010. "Identifying the effects of a lender of last resort on financial markets: Lessons from the founding of the fed," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(1), pages 40-53, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew S. Jaremski & David C. Wheelock, 2019. "The Founding of the Federal Reserve, the Great Depression and the Evolution of the U.S. Interbank Network," NBER Working Papers 26034, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Calomiris, Charles W. & Flandreau, Marc & Laeven, Luc, 2016. "Political foundations of the lender of last resort: A global historical narrative," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 48-65.
    3. Mark Carlson & David C. Wheelock, 2018. "Did the Founding of the Federal Reserve Affect the Vulnerability of the Interbank System to Contagion Risk?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 50(8), pages 1711-1750, December.
    4. Masami Imai & Tetsuji Okazaki & Michiru Sawada, 2019. "The Effects of Lender of Last Resort on Financial Intermediation during the Great Depression in Japan," Working Papers e129, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    5. Stefano Ugolini, 2018. "The Historical Evolution of Central Banking," Post-Print hal-01887004, HAL.
    6. Bruce Carlin & William Mann, 2017. "Finance, farms, and the Fed's early years," NBER Working Papers 23511, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Carlson, Mark A. & Wheelock, David C., 2016. "Did the Founding of the Federal Reserve Affect the Vulnerability of the Interbank System to Systemic Risk?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2016-059, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
    8. Jaremski, Matthew & Wheelock, David C., 2015. "Banker Preferences, Interbank Connections, and the Enduring Structure of the Federal Reserve System," Working Papers 2015-11, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, revised 16 Aug 2016.
    9. Masami Imai & Tetsuji Okazaki & Michiru Sawada, 2019. "The Effects of Lender of Last Resort on Financial Intermediation during the Great Depression in Japan," Wesleyan Economics Working Papers 2019-002, Wesleyan University, Department of Economics.
    10. Masami Imai & Tetsuji Okazaki & Michiru Sawada, 2019. "The Effects of Lender of Last Resort on Financial Intermediation during the Great Depression in Japan," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-1111, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    11. Anbil, Sriya & Vossmeyer, Angela, 2017. "Liquidity from Two Lending Facilities," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-117, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
    12. repec:eee:jfinec:v:130:y:2018:i:1:p:166-181 is not listed on IDEAS
    13. Jaremski, Matthew & Mathy, Gabrial, 2017. "Looking Back On the Age of Checking in America, 1800-1960," MPRA Paper 78083, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Hetzel, Robert L. & Richardson, Gary, 2016. "Money, Banking, and Monetary Policy from the Formation of the Federal Reserve until Today," Working Paper 16-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • N22 - Economic History - - Financial Markets and Institutions - - - U.S.; Canada: 1913-

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