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The Reverse Matthew Effect: Catastrophe and Consequence in Scientific Teams

  • Ginger Zhe Jin
  • Benjamin Jones
  • Susan Feng Lu
  • Brian Uzzi
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    Teamwork pervades modern economies, yet teamwork can make individual roles difficult to ascertain. In the sciences, the canonical "Matthew Effect" suggests that eminent team members garner credit for great works at the expense of less eminent team members. We study this phenomenon in reverse, investigating how damaging events, article retractions, affect citations to the authors' prior publications. We find that retractions impose little citation penalty on eminent coauthors, but less eminent coauthors face substantial citation declines, especially when teamed with an eminent author. This asymmetry suggests a "Reverse Matthew Effect" for team-produced catastrophes. A Bayesian model provides a candidate interpretation.

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    Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 19489.

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    Date of creation: Oct 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19489
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