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Career concerns and peer effects in institutional tournaments: Evidence from ECB reserve currency portfolios

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  • Benjamin Sahel
  • Antonio Scalia
  • Luana Zaccaria

Abstract

Using data on European Central Bank's (ECB's) reserve currency portfolios, we find that money managers react to relative rankings (i.e., own vs. peers’ performance) by adjusting portfolio active risk levels measured ex ante by actual deviations from their benchmark. This occurs in the absence of explicit incentives as no monetary reward is promised for winning this “tournament” among portfolio managers. We collect information on managers’ characteristics, including age, education, tenure, salary, and career path, and investigate the role played by implicit incentives. We provide evidence that both individual career concerns and institutional peer pressure contribute to the documented relationship between ranking and risk taking.

Suggested Citation

  • Benjamin Sahel & Antonio Scalia & Luana Zaccaria, 2021. "Career concerns and peer effects in institutional tournaments: Evidence from ECB reserve currency portfolios," Financial Management, Financial Management Association International, vol. 50(1), pages 47-73, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:finmgt:v:50:y:2021:i:1:p:47-73
    DOI: 10.1111/fima.12289
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    References listed on IDEAS

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