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Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers

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  • Lim, Jongha

    (University of MO)

  • Sensoy, Berk A.

    (OH State University)

  • Weisbach, Michael S.

    (OH State University)

Abstract

Indirect incentives exist in the money management industry when good current performance increases future inflows of new capital, leading to higher future fees. We quantify the magnitude of indirect performance incentives for hedge fund managers. Flows respond quickly and strongly to performance; lagged performance has a monotonically decreasing impact on flows as lags increase up to two years. Conservative estimates indicate that indirect incentives for the average fund are four times as large as direct incentives from incentive fees and returns to managers' own investment in the fund. For new funds, indirect incentives are seven times as large as direct incentives. Combining direct and indirect incentives, for each dollar generated for their investors in a given year, managers receive close to another dollar in direct performance fees plus the present value of future fees over the expected life of the fund. Older and capacity constrained funds have considerably weaker relations between future flows and performance, leading to weaker indirect incentives. There is no evidence that direct contractual incentives are stronger when market-based indirect incentives are weaker.

Suggested Citation

  • Lim, Jongha & Sensoy, Berk A. & Weisbach, Michael S., 2013. "Indirect Incentives of Hedge Fund Managers," Working Paper Series 2013-06, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ecl:ohidic:2013-06
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    Cited by:

    1. Itzhak Ben-David & Justin Birru & Andrea Rossi, 2020. "The Performance of Hedge Fund Performance Fees," NBER Working Papers 27454, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Mike Burkart & Amil Dasgupta, 2014. "Activist Funds, Leverage, and Procyclicality," FMG Discussion Papers dp733, Financial Markets Group.
    3. Sun, Lin & Teo, Melvyn, 2019. "Public hedge funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 44-60.
    4. Dasgupta, Amil & Piacentino, Giorgia, 2015. "The Wall Street walk when blockholders compete for flows," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 63144, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    5. Hong, Xin, 2014. "The dynamics of hedge fund share restrictions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 82-99.
    6. Lim, Jongha & Minton, Bernadette A. & Weisbach, Michael S., 2014. "Syndicated loan spreads and the composition of the syndicate," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 45-69.
    7. William Fung & David Hsieh & Narayan Naik & Melvyn Teo, 2021. "Hedge Fund Franchises," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(2), pages 1199-1226, February.
    8. Agarwal, Vikas & Green, T. Clifton & Ren, Honglin, 2018. "Alpha or beta in the eye of the beholder: What drives hedge fund flows?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 127(3), pages 417-434.
    9. SHIRAISHI Yutaro & IKEDA Naoshi & ARIKAWA Yasuhiro & INOUE Kotaro, 2019. "Stewardship Code, Institutional Investors, and Firm Value: International Evidence," Discussion papers 19077, Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI).
    10. Aiken, Adam L. & Clifford, Christopher P. & Ellis, Jesse A., 2015. "Hedge funds and discretionary liquidity restrictions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 197-218.
    11. Del Guercio, Diane & Genç, Egemen & Tran, Hai, 2018. "Playing favorites: Conflicts of interest in mutual fund management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 128(3), pages 535-557.
    12. Sheng, Jiliang & Xu, Si & An, Yunbi & Yang, Jun, 2021. "Dynamic portfolio strategy by loss-averse fund managers facing performance-induced fund flows," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    13. Judy Qiu & Leilei Tang & Ingo Walter, 2018. "Hedge fund incentives, management commitment and survivorship," Financial Markets and Portfolio Management, Springer;Swiss Society for Financial Market Research, vol. 32(2), pages 115-142, May.
    14. Brav, Alon & Dasgupta, Amil & Mathews, Richmond, 2016. "Wolf Pack Activism," CEPR Discussion Papers 11507, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors

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