How Does Provider Supply and Regulation Influence Health Care Market? Evidence from Nurse Practitioners and Physician Assistants
Nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs) now outnumber family practice doctors in the United States and are the principal providers of primary care to many communities. Recent growth of these professions has occurred amidst considerable cross-state variation in their regulation, with some states permitting autonomous practice and others mandating extensive physician oversight. I find that expanded NP and PA supply has had minimal impact on the office-based healthcare market overall, but utilization has been modestly more responsive to supply increases in states permitting greater autonomy. Results suggest the importance of laws impacting the division of labor, not just its quantity.
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|Date of creation:||Jun 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Journal of Health Economics Volume 33, January 2014, Pages 1–27 Cover image How does provider supply and regulation influence health care markets? Evidence from nurse practitioners and physician assistants ☆ Kevin Stange,|
|Note:||HC HE LS|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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