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Foreclosures, Enforcement, and Collections under the Federal Mortgage Modification Guidelines

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  • Casey B. Mulligan

Abstract

Federal mortgage modification initiatives, targeting millions of borrowers, are intended to prevent foreclosures of underwater home mortgages. Those initiatives discourage principal reductions in favor of interest reductions, despite the possibility that the former would be a more durable foreclosure prevention tool. The programs also impose marginal income tax rates substantially in excess of 100 percent. Using the framework of optimal income taxation, this paper shows how alternative means-tested modification rules would simultaneously improve collections, efficiency, the number of foreclosures, and their total cost. As a result, lenders have an incentive to foreclose on borrowers deemed modification eligible by the federal programs.

Suggested Citation

  • Casey B. Mulligan, 2010. "Foreclosures, Enforcement, and Collections under the Federal Mortgage Modification Guidelines," NBER Working Papers 15777, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15777
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mulligan Casey B, 2011. "Simple Analytics and Empirics of the Government Spending Multiplier and Other "Keynesian" Paradoxes," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(1), pages 1-47, June.
    2. John Y. Campbell, 2013. "Mortgage Market Design," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 17(1), pages 1-33.
    3. Feng Xu & Dazhong Wu & Jian Hua & Tih Koon Tan, 2022. "Preventive Maintenance for Mortgage Loans of Low-Income Borrowers," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 14(3), pages 1-66, February.
    4. Olsen, Edgar O. & Zabel, Jeffrey E., 2015. "US Housing Policy," Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, in: Gilles Duranton & J. V. Henderson & William C. Strange (ed.), Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics, edition 1, volume 5, chapter 0, pages 887-986, Elsevier.
    5. Natalia Kovrijnykh & Igor Livshits, 2017. "Screening As A Unified Theory Of Delinquency, Renegotiation, And Bankruptcy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 58(2), pages 499-527, May.
    6. Kurt Mitman & Iourii Manovskii & Fatih Karahan & Marcus Hagedorn, 2013. "Unemployment Benefits and Unemployment in the Great Recession: The Role of Macro Effects," 2013 Meeting Papers 1260, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Mulligan, Casey B., 2011. "Simple Analytics and Empirics of the Government Spending Multiplier and Other "Keynesian" Paradoxes," Working Papers 240, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    8. Marcus Hagedorn & Fatih Karahan & Iourii Manovskii & Kurt Mitman, 2013. "Unemployment Benefits and Unemployment in the Great Recession: The Role of Equilibrium Effects," Staff Reports 646, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    9. Kyle F. Herkenhoff & Lee E. Ohanian, 2016. "Foreclosure Delay and the U.S. Labor Market," Economic Policy Paper 16-7, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
    • R31 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Spatial Production Analysis, and Firm Location - - - Housing Supply and Markets

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