Means-Tested Mortgage Modification: Homes Saved or Income Destroyed?
This paper uses the theories of price discrimination and optimal taxation to investigate effects of underwater mortgages on foreclosures and the incentives to earn income, and the degree to which those effects are shaped by public policy. I find that the federal government's means-tested mortgage modification plan creates a massive implicit tax that may be significant even from a macroeconomic perspective. An alternative of modifying mortgages to maximize lender collections would also feature means tests, but with less effort distortion and perhaps fewer foreclosures. The paper also considers the consequences of a public policy that left mortgage modification to lenders, subject to a requirement that modification would not be conditioned on borrower income.
|Date of creation:||Aug 2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Dick, Andrew W. & Edlin, Aaron S., 1997.
"The implicit taxes from college financial aid,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 295-322, September.
- Michelle J. White & Ning Zhu, 2008.
"Saving Your Home in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy,"
NBER Working Papers
14179, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Mishkin, Frederic S., 1978. "The Household Balance Sheet and the Great Depression," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 38(04), pages 918-937, December.
- Christopher L. Foote & Kristopher S. Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, 2008.
"Negative equity and foreclosure: theory and evidence,"
Public Policy Discussion Paper
08-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston.
- Foote, Christopher L. & Gerardi, Kristopher & Willen, Paul S., 2008. "Negative equity and foreclosure: Theory and evidence," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(2), pages 234-245, September.
- Borys Grochulski, 2008.
"Optimal personal bankruptcy design : A Mirrlees approach,"
08-05, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
- Borys Grochulski, 2007. "Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Design: A Mirrlees Approach," 2007 Meeting Papers 1008, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Igor Livshits & James MacGee & Michele Tertilt, 2005.
"Consumer Bankruptcy: A Fresh Start,"
04-011, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
- Raymond Chiang & Chester S. Spatt, 1982. "Imperfect Price Discrimination and Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 155-181.
- Ben S. Bernanke, 1983.
"Non-Monetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great Depression,"
NBER Working Papers
1054, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bernanke, Ben S, 1983. "Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in Propagation of the Great Depression," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 257-276, June.
- Christopher L. Foote & Kristopher S. Gerardi & Lorenz Goette & Paul S. Willen, 2009.
"Reducing foreclosures: no easy answers,"
FRB Atlanta Working Paper
2009-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
- J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
- Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, 2010.
"Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance,"
in: Income Taxation, Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar (TAPES), pages 85-114
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, 2010. "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 2(2), pages 85-114, May.
- Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, 2008. "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance," NBER Working Papers 14403, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Saez, Emmanuel & Chetty, Nadarajan, 2010. "Optimal Taxation and Social Insurance with Endogenous Private Insurance," Scholarly Articles 9696326, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Kahn, Charles M & Yavas, Abdullah, 1994. "The Economic Role of Foreclosures," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 35-51, January.
- Mulligan Casey B, 2001.
"Aggregate Implications of Indivisible Labor,"
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics,
De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-35, April.
- Song Han & Wenli Li, 2007. "Fresh Start or Head Start? The Effects of Filing for Personal Bankruptcy on Work Effort," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 31(2), pages 123-152, June.
- Ljungqvist, Lars & Sargent, Thomas J., 2007. "Understanding European unemployment with a representative family model," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(8), pages 2180-2204, November.
- Casey B. Mulligan, 2008. "A Depressing Scenario: Mortgage Debt Becomes Unemployment Insurance," NBER Working Papers 14514, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Aaron S. Edlin, 1993. "Is College Financial Aid Equitable and Efficient?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 143-158, Spring.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:15281. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ()
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.