IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/restud/v49y1982i2p155-181..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Imperfect Price Discrimination and Welfare

Author

Listed:
  • Raymond Chiang
  • Chester S. Spatt

Abstract

We develop a model in which a monopolist uses differences across consumers in their valuation of time to imperfectly price discriminate. Though it is customary to analyse price discrimination problems by the calculus of variations after postulating a continuum of types, we assume a finite number of types and exploit the geometry and duality of the contract set and the structure of the programming specification. We analyse in detail the qualitative properties of the model's solution and show by construction that our results exhaust the implications of the model for equilibrium contract pairs. We show that imperfect discrimination is not bounded in welfare terms between perfect discrimination and single-price monopoly and that the deadweight loss, consumer surplus and output comparisons between single-price monopoly and imperfect discrimination are ambiguous.

Suggested Citation

  • Raymond Chiang & Chester S. Spatt, 1982. "Imperfect Price Discrimination and Welfare," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 49(2), pages 155-181.
  • Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:49:y:1982:i:2:p:155-181.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.2307/2297268
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Matthews, Steven & Moore, John, 1987. "Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 441-467, March.
    2. Ian Novos & Michael Waldman, 1983. "The Social Welfare Consequences of Limiting Nonexcludability: An Analytical Approach," UCLA Economics Working Papers 295, UCLA Department of Economics.
    3. Steven Matthews & John Moore, 1984. "Monopoly Provision of Product Quality and Warranties," Discussion Papers 585R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    4. Tåg, Joacim, 2009. "Paying to remove advertisements," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 21(4), pages 245-252, November.
    5. Russell Cooper, 1983. "On Allocative Distortions in Problems of Self-Selection," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 647R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    6. Michael Waldman, 1983. "Optimal Pricing Given Transaction Costs: The Case of Reserve Versus General Admission Seating," UCLA Economics Working Papers 284, UCLA Department of Economics.
    7. Fischer, Carolyn, 2005. "On the importance of the supply side in demand-side management," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 165-180, January.
    8. Giaume, Stephanie & Guillou, Sarah, 2004. "Price discrimination and concentration in European airline markets," Journal of Air Transport Management, Elsevier, vol. 10(5), pages 305-310.
    9. Preyas S. Desai & Devavrat Purohit, 2004. "“Let Me Talk to My Manager”: Haggling in a Competitive Environment," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 23(2), pages 219-233, August.
    10. Volker Nocke & Martin Peitz, 2003. "Monopoly Pricing under Demand Uncertainty: Final Sales versus Introductory ffers," PIER Working Paper Archive 03-002, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    11. Fischer, Carolyn, 2004. "Who Pays for Energy Efficiency Standards?," Discussion Papers dp-04-11, Resources For the Future.
    12. Chester Spatt, 1983. "The objectives of private and public judges," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 139-143, January.
    13. Casey B. Mulligan, 2009. "Means-Tested Mortgage Modification: Homes Saved or Income Destroyed?," NBER Working Papers 15281, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    14. Miceli, Thomas J., 1999. "Settlement delay as a sorting device," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 265-274, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:49:y:1982:i:2:p:155-181.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Oxford University Press) or (Christopher F. Baum). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.