Searching for the EU Social Dialogue Model
The European Union and the United States operate different variants of market capitalism. The EU model uses social dialogue institutions to help determine economic outcomes, particularly in the labor market, whereas the US relies more on market forces. The theory of competitive markets provides a powerful framework for analyzing market driven economies and for assessing the conditions under which unfettered markets yield desirable outcomes. But there is no comparable framework for analyzing institution driven economies. This paper argues that models of efficient bargaining/the Coase Theorem offer the best framework for analyzing social dialogue economies and for identifying policies and institutional reforms to improve their functioning.
|Date of creation:||Jun 2006|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published as Acocella, Nicola and Riccardo Leoni (eds.) Social Pacts, Employment and Growth: A Reappraisal of Ezio Tarantelli's Thought. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 2007.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002.
"Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players,"
- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
- Wilkie, Simon & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Working Papers 1150, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, 1981.
"The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests,"
470, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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