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Searching for the EU Social Dialogue Model

In: Social Pacts, Employment and Growth. A Reappraisal of Ezio Tarantelli’s Thought

  • Richard B. Freeman

    (Harvard University)

The chapter acknowledges the lack of a theory of social dialogue. In spite of this weakness, the author argues that efficient bargaining/Coase theorem can be a valuable ideal for analyzing social dialogue systems like most EU economies, compared to the perfectly functioning competitive model used to benchmark market-driven economies, even though the world does not evidence efficient bargaining as a general rule. The author also underlines the virtue of a research program tending to design factors that lead parties to efficient solutions, not only on the assumption of rational strategic behaviour but also on potentially more realistic assumptions about how people take their decisions.

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This chapter was published in:
  • Nicola Acocella & Riccardo Leoni (ed.), 2007. "Social Pacts, Employment and Growth. A Reappraisal of Ezio Tarantelli’s Thought," AIEL Series in Labour Economics, AIEL - Associazione Italiana Economisti del Lavoro, number 02.
  • This item is provided by AIEL - Associazione Italiana Economisti del Lavoro in its series AIEL Series in Labour Economics with number 02-11.
    Handle: RePEc:ail:chapts:02-11
    Contact details of provider: Postal: Dipartimento di Giurisprudenza, Seconda Universitá di Napoli, Via Mazzocchi 5, 81055 S. Maria Capua Vetere (CE)
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    1. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Microeconomics 0211008, EconWPA.
    2. Hoffman, Elizabeth & Spitzer, Matthew L, 1982. "The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 73-98, April.
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