Searching for the EU Social Dialogue Model
In: Social Pacts, Employment and Growth. A Reappraisal of Ezio Tarantelli’s Thought
The chapter acknowledges the lack of a theory of social dialogue. In spite of this weakness, the author argues that efficient bargaining/Coase theorem can be a valuable ideal for analyzing social dialogue systems like most EU economies, compared to the perfectly functioning competitive model used to benchmark market-driven economies, even though the world does not evidence efficient bargaining as a general rule. The author also underlines the virtue of a research program tending to design factors that lead parties to efficient solutions, not only on the assumption of rational strategic behaviour but also on potentially more realistic assumptions about how people take their decisions.
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- Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, 1981.
"The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests,"
470, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Wilkie, Simon & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002.
"Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players,"
1150, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2005. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 72(2), pages 543-566.
- Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Microeconomics 0211008, EconWPA.
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