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Testing for Ownership Mix Efficiency: The Case of the Nursing Home Industry

Author

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  • Rexford E. Santerre
  • John A. Vernon

Abstract

This paper offers an empirical test of ownership mix efficiency in the U.S. nursing home industry. We test to compare the benefits of quality assurance with the costs from the attenuation of property rights that result from an increased presence of nonprofit organizations. The empirical results suggest that too few nonprofit nursing homes may exist in the typical market area of the U.S. The policy implication is that more quality of care per dollar might be obtained by attracting a greater percentage of nonprofit nursing homes into most market areas.

Suggested Citation

  • Rexford E. Santerre & John A. Vernon, 2005. "Testing for Ownership Mix Efficiency: The Case of the Nursing Home Industry," NBER Working Papers 11115, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:11115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, 1998. "Nonprofit Production and Competition," NBER Working Papers 6377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Cohen, Joel W. & Spector, William D., 1996. "The effect of Medicaid reimbursement on quality of care in nursing homes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 23-48, February.
    3. Nyman, John A, 1994. "The Effects of Market Concentration and Excess Demand on the Price of Nursing Home Care," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(2), pages 193-204, June.
    4. Grabowski, David C. & Hirth, Richard A., 2003. "Competitive spillovers across non-profit and for-profit nursing homes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 1-22, January.
    5. Nyman, John A & Bricker, Dennis L, 1989. "Profit Incentives and Technical Efficiency in the Production of Nursing Home Care," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 71(4), pages 586-594, November.
    6. O. David Gulley & Rexford E. Santerre, 2003. "The Effect of Public Policies on Nursing Home Care in the United States," Eastern Economic Journal, Eastern Economic Association, vol. 29(1), pages 93-104, Winter.
    7. Chou, Shin-Yi, 2002. "Asymmetric information, ownership and quality of care: an empirical analysis of nursing homes," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 293-311, March.
    8. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-838, May.
    9. Svorny, Shirley V, 1987. "Physician Licensure: A New Approach to Examining the Role of Professional Interests," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(3), pages 497-509, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Karen Eggleston & Yu-Chu Shen & Joseph Lau & Christopher H. Schmid & Jia Chan, 2008. "Hospital ownership and quality of care: what explains the different results in the literature?," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(12), pages 1345-1362.
    2. Ben-Ner Avner & Karaca-Mandic Pinar & Ren Ting, 2012. "Ownership and Quality in Markets with Asymmetric Information: Evidence from Nursing Homes," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-33, October.
    3. Sergio Destefanis & Ornella W. Maietta, 2015. "Property rights and efficiency in the care sector. Evidence from Italy," Journal of Entrepreneurial and Organizational Diversity, European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises, vol. 4(2), pages 98-115, February.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I1 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health
    • L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
    • L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior

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