Physician Licensure: A New Approach to Examining the Role of Professional Interests
For years, economists have debated the extent to which organized medicine has benefited from medical licensing restrictions. This debate has b een hampered by the lack of a viable alternative hypothesis. This pap er provides an alternative hypothesis and suggests an empirical test which focuses on the relationship between licensure restrictions and the level of consumption of physician services across states. The evi dence suggests that in the mid-1960s the interests of organized medic ine dominated those of consumers in influencing the medical regulator y supply process. Copyright 1987 by Oxford University Press.
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Volume (Year): 25 (1987)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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