Is there a difference between solicited and unsolicited bank ratings and if so, why ?
This paper analyses the effect of soliciting a rating on the rating outcome of banks. Using a sample of Asian banks rated by Fitch Ratings ("Fitch"), I find evidence that unsolicited ratings tend to be lower than solicited ones, after accounting for differences in observed bank characteristics. This downward bias does not seem to be explained by the fact that betterquality banks selfselect into the solicited group. Rather, unsolicited ratings appear to be lower because they are based on public information. As a result, they tend to be more conservative than solicited ratings, which incorporate both public and nonpublic information.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2006|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Boulevard de Berlaimont 14, B-1000 Bruxelles|
Phone: (+ 32) (0) 2 221 25 34
Fax: (+ 32) (0) 2 221 31 62
Web page: https://www.nbb.be/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- H. Kent Baker & Sattar A. Mansi, 2002. "Assessing Credit Rating Agencies by Bond Issuers and Institutional Investors," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 29(9&10), pages 1367-1398.
- Berger, Allen N & Davies, Sally M & Flannery, Mark J, 2000.
"Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What When?,"
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 641-667, August.
- Allen N. Berger & Sally M. Davies & Mark J. Flannery, 2000. "Comparing market and supervisory assessments of bank performance: who knows what when?," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 641-670.
- Allen N. Berger & Sally M. Davies & Mark J. Flannery, 1998. "Comparing market and supervisory assessments of bank performance: who knows what when?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 1998-32, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
- Warren Bailey & Haitao Li & Connie X. Mao & Rui Zhong, 2003. "Regulation Fair Disclosure and Earnings Information: Market, Analyst, and Corporate Responses," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(6), pages 2487-2514, December.
- Boyd, John, 2000. "Comment on Comparing Market and Supervisory Assessments of Bank Performance: Who Knows What, When?," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 32(3), pages 668-670, August.
- DeYoung, Robert, et al, 2001. "The Information Content of Bank Exam Ratings and Subordinated Debt Prices," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 33(4), pages 900-925, November.
- Davidson, Russell & MacKinnon, James G., 1993. "Estimation and Inference in Econometrics," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195060119.
- repec:adr:anecst:y:1999:i:55-56:p:09 is not listed on IDEAS
- Cantor, Richard & Packer, Frank, 1997. "Differences of opinion and selection bias in the credit rating industry," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 21(10), pages 1395-1417, October.
- Jason Abrevaya & Jerry A. Hausman, 1999. "Semiparametric Estimation with Mismeasured Dependent Variables: An Application to Duration Models for Unemployment Spells," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 55-56, pages 243-275.
- Baek, Jae-Seung & Kang, Jun-Koo & Suh Park, Kyung, 2004. "Corporate governance and firm value: evidence from the Korean financial crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 265-313, February.
- repec:adr:anecst:y:1999:i:55-56 is not listed on IDEAS Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)