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The impact of issuer-pay on corporate bond rating properties: Evidence from Moody׳s and S&P׳s initial adoptions

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  • Bonsall, Samuel B.

Abstract

This study examines whether and how the properties of corporate bond ratings change following Moody׳s and S&P׳s adoptions of the issuer-pay business model in the early 1970s. Regulators and debt market observers have criticized the issuer-pay model for creating an independence problem. However, the issuer-pay model allows for economic bonding between rating agencies and issuers through explicit contractual arrangements, which should improve the flow of nonpublic information. Using a difference-in-difference research design, I find that more optimistic ratings by issuer-pay rating agencies predict greater future profitability, differences between the ratings of issuer-pay and investor-pay rating agencies are associated with narrower secondary bond market bid-ask spreads, and that issuer-pay rating agencies become relatively more accurate and timely predictors of default compared to investor-pay agencies after the adoption of issuer-pay. These results reinterpret the recent findings of optimistic ratings by Jiang et al. (2012) as consistent with more informative bond ratings.

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  • Bonsall, Samuel B., 2014. "The impact of issuer-pay on corporate bond rating properties: Evidence from Moody׳s and S&P׳s initial adoptions," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 89-109.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jaecon:v:57:y:2014:i:2:p:89-109
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.01.001
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bond rating agencies; Issuer-pay model; Conflicts of interest; Rating quality; Accuracy; Timeliness;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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