Formalization of ethics : the issue of standardization
Beyond the presupposed cleavage between economics and ethics, the institutional dimension of economic ethics is to the emphasized. The question is : how can we define collective legal rules which concern the whole society ? The other great issue of ethics formalization is then the implementation on the level of firms. The firm can use a large scope of instruments in order to formalize economic ethics. The asset of ethical standards is that they represent a specific way of coordination. They bring positive effects such as the fall of coordination cost and the reduction of uncertainty. Ethical standards can be regarded as a way to get information. They are also a way to formalize a " common morality ", or even an universal morality in a Kantian conception. The central issue, regarding ethical standards, remains its origin and its construction.
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