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Dualisme du marché du travail de la firme. Investissement de forme, coûts de transaction et comportements stratégiques des acteurs sociaux

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  • Michel Ferrary

Abstract

[fre] L'analyse du marché du travail sous l'angle de l'économie des institutions permet de distinguer les pratiques de gestion de l'emploi relevant d'une logique marchande d'allocation des ressources (la flexibilité externe) de celles s'inscrivant dans une logique administrative (la gestion prévisionnelle de l'emploi). Le niveau des coûts de transaction lié à l'utilisation de la convention de coordination marchande n'est pas indépendant du comportement des acteurs de la firme. En fonction de leurs intérêts, les acteurs du marché du travail: l'Etat, les firmes, les salariés et les syndicats favoriseront ou gêneront le fonctionnement des mécanismes concurrentiels du marché du travail. Le comportement stratégique de ces acteurs influencera l'engagement d'investissements de formes permettant la standardisation des compétences nécessaire au fonctionnement du marché. Cette endogéneïsation des mécanismes du marché du travail ouvre la voie à des stratégies d'acteurs visant soit à favoriser les mécanismes marchands par la flexibilité externe de l'emploi, soit le développement du marché interne du travail de la firme par la régulation administrative et la gestion prévisionnelle de l'emploi. [eng] A labor market analysis from the « Neo Institutional Economics » point of view, allows to dififerenciate between external market flexibility and internal flexibility within firms using manpower planning. The transaction costs of external flexibility depends on the actors' behavior based on self interest (government, firms, employees, unions). They will accordingling hinder or facilitate labor market adjustments. These strategic postures will affect the necessary investments to standardize skills and competencies so as to facilitate the creation of markets.

Suggested Citation

  • Michel Ferrary, 1994. "Dualisme du marché du travail de la firme. Investissement de forme, coûts de transaction et comportements stratégiques des acteurs sociaux," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 9(4), pages 85-135.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:rfreco:rfeco_0769-0479_1994_num_9_4_967
    DOI: 10.3406/rfeco.1994.967
    Note: DOI:10.3406/rfeco.1994.967
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Olivier Favereau, 1989. "Marchés internes, marchés externes," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 40(2), pages 273-328.
    2. R.H. Coase & Xavier Gillis & Cécile Thiébault, 1987. "La nature de la firme," Revue Française d'Économie, Programme National Persée, vol. 2(1), pages 133-163.
    3. George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
    4. Olivier Favereau, 2002. "Présentation," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 53(2), pages 273-274.
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