IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/mse/cesdoc/10079.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The end of the Bertrand Paradox?

Author

Listed:
  • Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin

    () (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics & Ecole normale supérieure de Cachan)

  • Nicolas Drouhin

    () (Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - Paris School of Economics & Ecole normale supérieure de Cachan)

Abstract

This paper analyzes price competition in the case of two firms operating under constant returns to scale with more than one production factor. Factors are chosen sequentially in a two-stage game implying a convex short term cost function in the second stage of the game. We show that the collusive outcome is the only predictable issue of the whole game i.e. the unique non Pareto-dominated pure strategy Nash Equilibrium. Technically, this paper bridges the capacity constraint literature on price competition with the one of convex cost function, solving the Bertrand Paradox in the line of Edgeworth's research program

Suggested Citation

  • Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nicolas Drouhin, 2010. "The end of the Bertrand Paradox?," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 10079, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
  • Handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10079
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: ftp://mse.univ-paris1.fr/pub/mse/CES2010/10079.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Prabal Chowdhury & Kunal Sengupta, 2004. "Coalition-proof Bertrand equilibria," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(2), pages 307-324, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Julie Brux & Claudine Desrieux, 2014. "To allot or not to allot public services? An incomplete contract approach," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 455-476, June.
    2. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nicolas Drouhin, 2014. "Tacit Collusion in a One-Shot Game of Price Competition with Soft Capacity Constraints," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 427-442, June.
    3. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nicolas Drouhin, 2012. "Tacit collusion in a one-shot game of price competition with soft capacity constraints," Working Papers hal-00709093, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Price competition; collusion; convex cost; Bertrand Paradox; capacity constraint; constant returns-to-scale;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mse:cesdoc:10079. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lucie Label). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/cenp1fr.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.