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Collusive outcomes in price competition

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  • Krishnendu Dastidar

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Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Krishnendu Dastidar, 2001. "Collusive outcomes in price competition," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 81-93, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:73:y:2001:i:1:p:81-93
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02339582
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Kreps, David M. & Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 245-252, August.
    2. James W. Friedman, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(1), pages 1-12.
    3. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321.
    4. Bulow, Jeremy I & Geanakoplos, John D & Klemperer, Paul D, 1985. "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and Complements," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(3), pages 488-511, June.
    5. Dixon, Huw, 1990. "Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibria when Firms Avoid Turning Customers Away," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages 131-146, December.
    6. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Krishna, Vijay, 1985. "Finitely Repeated Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 905-922, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. repec:hal:journl:halshs-00542486 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Flavio Delbono & Luca Lambertini, 2016. "Bertrand versus Cournot with convex variable costs," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 4(1), pages 73-83, April.
    3. repec:kap:jincot:v:17:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10842-017-0246-3 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Matsumura, Toshihiro, 2012. "Welfare consequence of an asymmetric regulation in a mixed Bertrand duopoly," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 94-96.
    5. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Jonas Didisse, 2017. "Inter-university competition and high tuition fees," Working Papers halshs-01174291, HAL.
    6. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nicolas Drouhin, 2014. "Tacit Collusion in a One-Shot Game of Price Competition with Soft Capacity Constraints," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(2), pages 427-442, June.
    7. Cabon-Dhersin Marie-Laure & Drouhin Nicolas, 2017. "A general model of price competition with soft capacity constraints," Working Papers 2017-56, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
    8. Willington Manuel & Alegría Alexander, 2012. "Collusion in a One-Period Insurance Market with Adverse Selection," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 12(1), pages 1-32, April.
    9. Saporiti Alejandro & Coloma Germán, 2010. "Bertrand Competition in Markets with Fixed Costs," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-30, June.
    10. Tomomichi Mizuno & Kazuhiro Takauchi, 2018. "Optimal export policy with upstream price competition," Discussion Papers 1805, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.
    11. Makoto Yano & Takashi Komatsubara, 2012. "Price Competition or Tacit Collusion," KIER Working Papers 807, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    12. Alejandro Saporiti & German Coloma, 2008. "Bertrand's price competition in markets with fixed costs," RCER Working Papers 541, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    13. Marie-Laure Cabon-Dhersin & Nicolas Drouhin, 2012. "Tacit collusion in a one-shot game of price competition with soft capacity constraints," Working Papers hal-00709093, HAL.
    14. Germán Coloma & Alejandro Saporiti, 2006. "Bertrand equilibria in markets with fixed costs," The School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 0627, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    15. Flavio Delbono & Gemma Dipoppa & Luca Lambertini & Carlo Reggiani, 2017. "A Single Espresso, Please! Rationalizing Espresso Price Dispersion Across Italian Cities," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 465-478, December.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    price competition; collusion; convex cost; L13;

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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