Dynamic Seigniorage Models Revisited. Should Fiscal Flexibility and Conservative Central Bankers Go Together?
This paper presents a dynamic seigniorage model where excessive debt levels persist in steady state, causing a permanent inflation bias. Discretionary monetary responses to shocks are too interventionist because they do not take into account the role of debt policy, which spreads part of the adjustment onto future periods. Institutional design should contemplate the appointment of weight-conservative central bankers. The central bank preferences should be more conservative the more the government is willing to delay the adjustment of expenditures following a supply shock. The combination of fiscal intervention and a zero inflation rule describes how members of a monetary union might react to asymmetric shocks. The costs of this regime are negligible if the discount factor is small and seigniorage losses are limited.
|Date of creation:||Jul 1997|
|Date of revision:||Feb 1999|
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- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997.
"Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration,"
Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers
233606, University of California-Berkeley, Department of Economics.
- Maurice Obstfeld and ., 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C97-085, University of California at Berkeley.
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- Maurice Obstfeld, 1989. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," NBER Working Papers 2869, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, 1997. "Dynamic Seigniorage Theory: An Exploration," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt712610vq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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- Anton Muscatelli, 1998. "Inflation Contracts And Inflation Targets Under Uncertainty: Why We Might Need Conservative Bankers," Working Papers 9801, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow.
- Muscatelli, V Anton, 1999. "Inflation Contracts and Inflation Targets under Uncertainty: Why We Might Need Conservative Central Bankers," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 66(262), pages 241-254, May.
- van der Ploeg, Frederick, 1995. "Political Economy of Monetary and Budgetary Policy," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(2), pages 427-439, May.
- Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
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