Are antidumping duties an antidote for predation?
Since price discrimination and selling below cost arise in the normal course of business and are usually legal for home firms, countering these practices by foreign firms provides a very weak rationale for antidumping duties. If antidumping duties were to provide a systematic defense against predation by foreign firms, however, a strong ''fair-trade'' justification would remain. This paper adapts the classic entry-deterrence analysis of Dixit (1979) and Brander and Spencer (1981) to provide a simple treatment of predation, which is applicable with price leadership as well as quantity leadership. Although situations of cross-border predation appear to be quite rare, foreign firms may sometimes find themselves in leadership positions if they have to make shipments and/or set prices before their home rivals. This paper shows that, in the context of such an international leadership game, predation ma y occur without dumping and vice versa. Further, when dumping and predation do coexist, a sophisticated form of antidumping duty would prevent predation, but the simple antidumping duties that are generally observed in practice will often be insufficient. Consequently, the paper challenges the ''fair-trade'' view of antidumping policy as an antidote for predation and strengthens the foundation of the counter-argument that antidumping constitutes a new insidious form of protectionism and trade harassment, which is of particularly serious concerns for small countries.
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- Hartigan, James C., 1994. "Dumping and signaling," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 69-81, January.
- James C. Hartigan, 1996. "Predatory Dumping," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 29(1), pages 228-39, February.
- Dixit, Avinash K., 1978.
"A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
125, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Avinash Dixit, 1979. "A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 20-32, Spring.
- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1981.
"Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
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- James A. Brander & Barbara J. Spencer, 1980. "Tariffs and the Extraction of Foreign Monopoly Rents under Potential Entry," Working Papers 414, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Stephen E. Haynes, 2002. "Antidumping Investigations and the Pass-Through of Antidumping Duties and Exchange Rates," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1044-1061, September.
- Bruce A. Blonigen & Thomas J. Prusa, 2001. "Antidumping," NBER Working Papers 8398, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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NBER Working Papers
7404, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baldwin, Richard E., 1994. "The impact of the 1986 US--Japan semiconductor agreement," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 129-152, June.
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