Production Cost Asymmetry, Minimum Access and Reciprocal Dumping
In this article we propose a bilateral dumping model in which the minimum access level is endogenous. Regions compete with one another using Cournot conjectures and engage in interregional dumping as in Brander and Krugman’s (1983) reciprocal dumping model. International trade is hindered by restrictive Tariff rate Quota (TRQs). The model features two regions and one product. We derive the conditions under which it is optimal to observe interregional trade and those under which trade does not exist. The results show that the world price and the difference in production costs between regions play an important role in determining whether bilateral trade exists. In the presence of bilateral trade, the region with the largest market size will obtain the largest share of import volumes permitted under the minimum access system while in the absence of interregional trade, the distribution of import permits between regions will also depends on the product cost asymmetry. When only the most efficient region exports to the least efficient region, production costs asymmetry, transaction costs and world price level determine whether the smaller or larger region obtains the larger share of product import allowed under minimum access commitment. In all cases, we show that in a country like Canada, creation of “artificial barriers” to interprovincial trade of products under supply management system lowers the welfare of at least one of the regions, along with the global welfare.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Date of revision:|
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