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Taxation and Incomplete Contracts

  • Simone Moriconi

    ()

    (ITEMQ, Università Cattolica di Milano and CREA, University of Luxembourg)

This paper analyzes the impact of taxation on economic effciency when contracts are incomplete. We assume firms operate in a perfect competitive market and can choose between integrated or non-integrated governance to cope with contract incompleteness. Taxation reduces incentives to pursue intra-firm coordination, thus the effciency of firm's production process under non-integration. This is not the case under integration, since production decisions are transferred to the Headquarters, at a fixed integration cost. Taxation may then induce firms to change their organization at the industry equilibrium. We show that a tax that induces firms to choose integration rather than non-integration may serve a corrective function if integration costs and market prices are not too high.

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Paper provided by Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg in its series CREA Discussion Paper Series with number 12-08.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:luc:wpaper:12-08
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