Do clubs foster provision success ?
We report the results of an experiment on the provision of a step-level collective good. We compare subjects’ behavior in a public good game and in a club good game. In the club good game, players who contribute less than the amount required to become a member, do not benefit from the collective good. Compared to the benchmark step-level public good, we find that the introduction of a small membership fee has surprisingly strong effects. It increases significantly the provision success of the collective good.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2009|
|Date of revision:||Dec 2009|
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