Voluntary participation and cooperation in a collective-good game
We study the effect of voluntary participation in the context of a collective-good experiment. We investigate whether the freedom to participate in the game or not can affect contribution levels over time. The analysis of two voluntary-participation treatments supports a noticeable effect of an attractive exit option on contribution levels. We conclude that voluntary participation can induce a recovery of cooperation levels when the payoff yielded by the exit option is high enough, so that the usually observed decay of average contribution levels can be counteracted.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Communication and Free-Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 26(4), pages 585-608, October.
- R. Isaac & James Walker & Susan Thomas, 1984. "Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 113-149, January.
- Coricelli, Giorgio & Fehr, Dietmar & Fellner, Gerlinde, 2004.
"Partner Selection in Public Goods Experiments,"
151, Institute for Advanced Studies.
- Isaac, R. Mark & Walker, James M. & Williams, Arlington W., 1994. "Group size and the voluntary provision of public goods : Experimental evidence utilizing large groups," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 1-36, May.
- Talbot Page & Louis Putterman & Bulent Unel, 2002.
"Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency,"
2002-19, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Talbot Page & Louis Putterman & Bulent Unel, 2005. "Voluntary Association in Public Goods Experiments: Reciprocity, Mimicry and Efficiency," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(506), pages 1032-1053, October.
- Karl-Martin Ehrhart & Claudia Keser, 1999. "Mobility and Cooperation: On the Run," CIRANO Working Papers 99s-24, CIRANO.
- Masclet, D. & Noussair, C. & Tucker, S. & Villeval, M.C., 2001.
"Monetary and Non-monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism,"
Purdue University Economics Working Papers
1141, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
- David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March.
- David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2001. "Monetary and Non-Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," Post-Print halshs-00151423, HAL.
- David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and non Monetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," Post-Print halshs-00175251, HAL.
- Keser, Claudia & van Winden, Frans, 2000. " Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(1), pages 23-39, March.
- J. Ledyard, 1997.
"Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
509, David K. Levine.
- Ledyard, John O., . "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Working Papers 861, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- John O. Ledyard, 1994. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Public Economics 9405003, EconWPA, revised 22 May 1994.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 1999.
"Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
183, CESifo Group Munich.
- Simon Gachter & Ernst Fehr, 2000. "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 980-994, September.
- Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments," IEW - Working Papers 010, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Esther Hauk, 1999.
"Multiple prisoner's dilemma games with (out) an outside option: An experimental study,"
Economics Working Papers
391, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Esther Hauk, 2003. "Multiple Prisoner's Dilemma Games with(out) an Outside Option: an Experimental Study," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 54(3), pages 207-229, May.
- R. M. Isaac & J. M. Walker, 2010.
"Group size effects in public goods provision: The voluntary contribution mechanism,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
310, David K. Levine.
- Isaac, R Mark & Walker, James M, 1988. "Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 103(1), pages 179-99, February.
- Claudia Keser & Claude Montmarquette, 2007.
"Voluntary Teaming and Effort,"
Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin
745, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
- Roberto Burlando & Francesco Guala, 2005. "Heterogeneous Agents in Public Goods Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 35-54, April.
- Ehrhart, Karl-Martin & Keser, Claudia, 1999. "Mobility and cooperation: on the run," Sonderforschungsbereich 504 Publications 99-69, Sonderforschungsbereich 504, Universität Mannheim;Sonderforschungsbereich 504, University of Mannheim.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:joepsy:v:31:y:2010:i:4:p:705-718. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.