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Market Structure, Scale Economies and Industry Performance

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  • Rabah Amir

    (University of Copenhagen, Institute of Economics)

Abstract

We provide an extensive and general investigation of the effects on industry performance (profits and social welfare) of exogenously changing the number of firms in a Cournot framework. This amounts to an in-depth exploration of the well-known trade-off between competition and production efficiency. We establish that under scale economies, welfare is maximized by a finite number of firms. Our results shed light on several theoretical issues and policy debates in industrial organization, including the relationship between the Herfindahl index and social welfare, free versus socially optimal entry, concentration and profitability, destructive competition and natural monopoly. Our analytical approach combines simplicity with generality

Suggested Citation

  • Rabah Amir, 2000. "Market Structure, Scale Economies and Industry Performance," Discussion Papers 00-08, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0008
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    Cited by:

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    2. Fang Tian & Greys Sošić & Laurens Debo, 2019. "Manufacturers’ Competition and Cooperation in Sustainability: Stable Recycling Alliances," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(10), pages 4733-4753, October.
    3. Doan, Tinh & Stevens, Philip, 2012. "Evolution of competition in Vietnam industries over the recent economic transition," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 6, pages 1-24.
    4. Ansari, Jugnu, 2012. "A New Measure of Competition in Indian Loan Market," MPRA Paper 50108, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Amir, Rabah & Lazzati, Natalia, 2011. "Network effects, market structure and industry performance," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(6), pages 2389-2419.
    6. Paul Belleflamme & Eric Toulemonde, 2009. "Negative Intra-Group Externalities In Two-Sided Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 50(1), pages 245-272, February.
    7. Koski, Heli & Pajarinen, Mika, 2013. "Empirical Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Competition Policy," ETLA Working Papers 15, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    8. Xuan Dong Nguyen & Xavier de Vanssay & Craig Parsons, 2015. "The Japanese Automobile Tyre Industry under Scrutiny," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 141-162, February.
    9. Jedlicka, Lorenz & Jumah, Adusei, 2006. "The Austrian Insurance Industry: A Structure, Conduct and Performance Analysis," Economics Series 189, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    10. Boone, J. & van Ours, J.C. & van der Wiel, H.P., 2007. "How (Not) to Measure Competition," Discussion Paper 2007-32, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Sara Amoroso & Peter M. Kort & Bertrand Melenberg & Joseph Plasmans & Mark Vancauteren, 2010. "Firm Level Productivity under Imperfect Competition in Output and Labor Markets," CESifo Working Paper Series 3082, CESifo.
    12. Lewis Evans & Patrick Hughes, 2003. "Competition Policy in Small Distant Open Economies: Some Lessons from the Economics Literature," Treasury Working Paper Series 03/31, New Zealand Treasury.
    13. Jugnu Ansari, 2013. "A new measure of competition in Indian loan markets," International Journal of Finance & Banking Studies, Center for the Strategic Studies in Business and Finance, vol. 2(4), pages 60-77, October.
    14. Hailu Abebe Wondirad, 2020. "Competition and microfinance institutions’ performance: evidence from India," International Journal of Corporate Social Responsibility, Springer, vol. 5(1), pages 1-19, December.
    15. Boone, J. & van Ours, J.C. & van der Wiel, H.P., 2007. "How (Not) to Measure Competition," Discussion Paper 2007-32, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    16. Manuela Mosca, 2008. "On the origins of the concept of natural monopoly: Economies of scale and competition," The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 15(2), pages 317-353.
    17. Schiersch Alexander & Schmidt-Ehmcke Jens, 2011. "Is the Boone-Indicator Applicable? – Evidence from a Combined Data Set of German Manufacturing Enterprises," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 231(3), pages 336-357, June.
    18. M. van Leuvensteijn, 2014. "The Boone-indicator: Identifying different regimes of competition for the American Sugar Refining Company 1890-1914," Working Papers 08-37, Utrecht School of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot oligopoly; Returns to scale; Entry; Equilibrium comparative statics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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