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Preferences-dependent learning in the Centipede game

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  • Astrid Gamba

    (University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy)

  • Tobias Regner

    (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)

Abstract

We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the quality of information feedbacks provided after each play. If subjects rely only on their personal database, long run behavior resembles a Self-confirming equilibrium whereby less pro-social types take at earlier nodes due to prediction errors. Aggregate information release decreases heterogeneity of behavior by increasing the passing rates of pro-selfs and play moves towards Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Astrid Gamba & Tobias Regner, 2015. "Preferences-dependent learning in the Centipede game," Jena Economics Research Papers 2015-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2015-012
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Crosetto & Marco Mantovani, 2018. "Representation effects in the centipede game," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 13(10), pages 1-13, October.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social preferences; learning; Self-confirming equilibrium; experiment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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