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Preferences-dependent learning in the Centipede game

Author

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  • Astrid Gamba

    () (University of Milan-Bicocca, Milan, Italy)

  • Tobias Regner

    () (School of Economics and Business Administration, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena)

Abstract

We study experimentally whether heterogeneity of behavior in the Centipede game can be interpreted as the result of a learning process of individuals with different preference types (more and less pro-social) and coarse information regarding the opponent's past behavior. We manipulate the quality of information feedbacks provided after each play. If subjects rely only on their personal database, long run behavior resembles a Self-confirming equilibrium whereby less pro-social types take at earlier nodes due to prediction errors. Aggregate information release decreases heterogeneity of behavior by increasing the passing rates of pro-selfs and play moves towards Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Astrid Gamba & Tobias Regner, 2015. "Preferences-dependent learning in the Centipede game," Jena Economic Research Papers 2015-012, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena.
  • Handle: RePEc:jrp:jrpwrp:2015-012
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jordi Brandts & Gary Charness, 2011. "The strategy versus the direct-response method: a first survey of experimental comparisons," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 14(3), pages 375-398, September.
    2. Jehiel, Philippe, 2005. "Analogy-based expectation equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 123(2), pages 81-104, August.
    3. Massimo Marinacci, 2015. "Model Uncertainty," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 13(6), pages 1022-1100, December.
    4. Gamba, Astrid, 2013. "Learning and evolution of altruistic preferences in the Centipede Game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 85(C), pages 112-117.
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    Cited by:

    1. Paolo Crosetto & Marco Mantovani, 2018. "Representation effects in the centipede game," Post-Print hal-01885390, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    social preferences; learning; Self-confirming equilibrium; experiment;

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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