The Winner's Curse under Behavioral Institutions
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References listed on IDEAS
- Greiner, Ben, 2004. "An Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments," MPRA Paper 13513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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Keywordsimperfect information; common value auction; price-quality relation;
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-03-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2011-03-05 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2011-03-05 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2011-03-05 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
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