Selfish Altruism, Fierce Cooperation and the Emergence of Cooperative Equilibria from Passing and Shooting
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References listed on IDEAS
- repec:adr:anecst:y:2001:i:63-64:p:03 is not listed on IDEAS
- Clark, Andrew E. & Oswald, Andrew J., 1998. "Comparison-concave utility and following behaviour in social and economic settings," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 133-155, October.
More about this item
Keywordsevolutionary game theory; fitness; altruism; evolution of cooperation; decoy; Nash equlibrium; repeated matching-pennies game; predator; emergence; autonomous ODE; classical Runge-Kutta method;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
- D87 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Neuroeconomics
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-EVO-2014-02-02 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-HPE-2014-02-02 (History & Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2014-02-02 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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