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The Distribution of Individual Conformity under Social Pressure across Societies

Author

Listed:
  • Michaeli, Moti

    (Department of Economics and The Center for the Study)

  • Spiro, Daniel

    (Dept. of Economics, University of Oslo)

Abstract

This paper studies the aggregate distribution of declared opinions and behavior when heterogeneous individuals make the trade-off between being true to their private opinions and conforming to an endogenous social norm. The model sheds light on how various punishment regimes induce conformity or law obedience, and by whom, and on phenomena such as societal polarization, unimodal concentration and alienation. In orthodox societies, individuals will tend to either fully conform or totally ignore the social norm, while individuals in liberal societies will tend to compromise between these two extremes. Furthermore, the degree of orthodoxy determines whether those who fairly agree with the norm or those who strongly disapprove it will conform. Likewise, the degree of liberalism determines which individuals will compromise the most. In addition, orthodox societies may adapt norms that are skewed with respect to the private opinions in society, while liberal societies will not do so.

Suggested Citation

  • Michaeli, Moti & Spiro, Daniel, 2013. "The Distribution of Individual Conformity under Social Pressure across Societies," Memorandum 12/2014, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:osloec:2014_012
    as

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    File URL: http://www.sv.uio.no/econ/english/research/unpublished-works/working-papers/pdf-files/2014/memo-12-2014.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Michaeli, Moti & Spiro, Daniel, 2014. "Skewed Norms under Peer Pressure: Formation and Collapse," Memorandum 15/2014, Oslo University, Department of Economics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social pressure; Conformity; Liberal; Orthodox; Compliance;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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