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Trust, Values and False Consensus

Author

Listed:
  • Butler, Jeffrey V.

    (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance)

  • Giuliano, Paola

    (University of California, Los Angeles)

  • Guiso, Luigi

    (Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance)

Abstract

Trust beliefs are heterogeneous across individuals and, at the same time, persistent across generations. We investigate one mechanism yielding these dual patterns: false consensus. In the context of a trust game experiment, we show that individuals extrapolate from their own type when forming trust beliefs about the same pool of potential partners – i.e., more (less) trustworthy individuals form more optimistic (pessimistic) trust beliefs - and that this tendency continues to color trust beliefs after several rounds of game-play. Moreover, we show that one's own type/trustworthiness can be traced back to the values parents transmit to their children during their upbringing. In a second closely-related experiment, we show the economic impact of mis-calibrated trust beliefs stemming from false consensus. Mis-calibrated beliefs lower participants' experimental trust game earnings by about 20 percent on average.

Suggested Citation

  • Butler, Jeffrey V. & Giuliano, Paola & Guiso, Luigi, 2012. "Trust, Values and False Consensus," IZA Discussion Papers 6916, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp6916
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. On false consensus
      by chris dillow in Stumbling and Mumbling on 2014-10-28 19:11:06

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    Cited by:

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    2. Bilgihan, Anil & Barreda, Albert & Okumus, Fevzi & Nusair, Khaldoon, 2016. "Consumer perception of knowledge-sharing in travel-related Online Social Networks," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 287-296.
    3. Schwerter, Frederik & Zimmermann, Florian, 2020. "Determinants of trust: The role of personal experiences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 413-425.
    4. Butler, Jeffrey V. & Fehr, Dietmar, 2024. "The causal effect of cultural identity on cooperation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 221(C), pages 134-147.
    5. Daniele, Gianmarco & Geys, Benny, 2015. "Interpersonal trust and welfare state support," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 1-12.
    6. Toussaert, Séverine, 2017. "Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 69803, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Ying Sophie Huang & Buhui Qiu & Jiajia Wu & Juan Yao, 2023. "Institutional distance, geographic distance, and Chinese venture capital investment: do networks and trust matter?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 61(4), pages 1795-1844, December.
    8. Berggren, Niclas & Nilsson, Therese, 2015. "Globalization and the transmission of social values: The case of tolerance," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 371-389.
    9. Sofianos, Andis, 2022. "Self-reported & revealed trust: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    10. Stone, Daniel, 2018. "Just a big misunderstanding? Bias and Bayesian affective polarization," SocArXiv 58sru, Center for Open Science.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    culture; trustworthiness; trust; false consensus;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A1 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics
    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • D1 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior
    • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics

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