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Educational Homogamy: Preferences or Opportunities?

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  • Nielsen, Helena Skyt

    (Aarhus University)

  • Svarer, Michael

    (Aarhus University)

Abstract

Individuals match on length and type of education. We investigate whether the systematic relationship between educations of partners is explained by opportunities (e.g. low search frictions) or preferences (e.g. complementarities in household production or portfolio optimization). We find that half of the systematic sorting on education is due to low search frictions in marriage markets of the educational institutions. The other half is attributed to complementarities in household production, since income properties of the joint income process show no influence on partner selection.

Suggested Citation

  • Nielsen, Helena Skyt & Svarer, Michael, 2006. "Educational Homogamy: Preferences or Opportunities?," IZA Discussion Papers 2271, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2271
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    Cited by:

    1. Mette Deding & Trine Filges, 2010. "Geographical Mobility Of Danish Dual‐Earner Couples—The Relationship Between Change Of Job And Change Of Residence," Journal of Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(2), pages 615-634, May.
    2. Longhi, Simonetta & Brynin, Malcolm & Martínez Pérez, à lvaro, 2008. "The social significance of homogamy," ISER Working Paper Series 2008-32, Institute for Social and Economic Research.
    3. Raaum Oddbjørn & Bratsberg Bernt & Røed Knut & Österbacka Eva & Eriksson Tor & Jäntti Markus & Naylor Robin A, 2008. "Marital Sorting, Household Labor Supply, and Intergenerational Earnings Mobility across Countries," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 7(2), pages 1-49, January.
    4. Helena Skyt Nielsen & Michael Svarer, 2009. "Educational Homogamy: How Much is Opportunities?," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 44(4).
    5. Kraft, Kornelius & Neimann, Stefanie, 2009. "Impact of Educational and Religious Homogamy on Marital Stability," IZA Discussion Papers 4491, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    6. Nielsen, Helena Skyt & Smith, Nina & Celikaksoy, Aycan, 2007. "The Effect of Marriage on Education of Immigrants: Evidence from a Policy Reform Restricting Spouse Import," IZA Discussion Papers 2899, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    hedging; search frictions; positive assortative matching on education; complementarities in household production;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity

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