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The Dynamics of Marriage and Divorce

Author

Listed:
  • Gustaf Bruze

    (Aarhus University [Aarhus])

  • Michael Svarer

    (TAU - Tel Aviv University)

  • Yoram Weiss

    (Aarhus University [Aarhus])

Abstract

We formulate and estimate a dynamic model of marriage, divorce and remarriage using 27 years old panel data for the enrire Danish cohort born in 1960. The marital surplus is identified from the probability of divorce, and the surplus shares of husband and wives from their willingness to enter marriage. Eduaction and marraige order are complements in generating gains from marriage. Educated men and women receive a larger share of the marital gains but this effect is mitigated when their proportion rises. Education stabilizes marriage and second marriage are less stable. As the cohort ages, uneducated men are the most likely to be single.

Suggested Citation

  • Gustaf Bruze & Michael Svarer & Yoram Weiss, 2012. "The Dynamics of Marriage and Divorce," Working Papers hal-03234851, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-03234851
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03234851
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    Cited by:

    1. Rafael González-Val & Miriam Marcén, 2018. "Unemployment, marriage and divorce," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 50(13), pages 1495-1508, March.
    2. Foerster, Hanno & Obermeier, Tim & Schulz, Bastian, 2024. "Job Displacement, Remarriage, and Marital Sorting," IZA Discussion Papers 17335, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. Cristina Borra & Martin Browning & Almudena Sevilla, 2021. "Marriage and housework," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(2), pages 479-508.
    4. Li, Li & Mak, Eric, 2016. "Marriage, Divorce, Remarriage: The Catalyst Effect of Unilateral Divorce," MPRA Paper 83330, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Rossi, Pauline & Xiao, Yun, 2026. "Left over or opting out? Squeeze, mismatch and surplus in Chinese marriage markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C).
    6. Aloysius Siow, 2015. "Testing Becker's Theory of Positive Assortative Matching," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 409-441.
    7. Jesper R.-V. Soerensen, 2020. "Testing a Class of Semi- or Nonparametric Conditional Moment Restriction Models using Series Methods," Discussion Papers 20-04, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    8. Blau, David M. & Goodstein, Ryan M., 2016. "Commitment in the household: Evidence from the effect of inheritances on the labor supply of older married couples," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 123-137.
    9. Bastian Schulz & Fabian Siuda, 2020. "Marriage and Divorce: The Role of Labor Market Institutions," CESifo Working Paper Series 8508, CESifo.
    10. Rafael González-Val & Miriam Marcén, 2017. "Divorce and the business cycle: a cross-country analysis," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 879-904, September.
    11. Rafael González-Val & Miriam Marcén, 2015. "Regional unemployment, marriage, and divorce," Working Papers 2015/38, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    12. Peter Fallesen & Lars H. Andersen, 2017. "Explaining the Consequences of Imprisonment for Union Formation and Dissolution in Denmark," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 36(1), pages 154-177, January.
    13. Laurens Cherchye & Bram De Rock & Frederic Vermeulen & Selma Walther, 2021. "Where did it go wrong? Marriage and divorce in Malawi," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(2), pages 505-545, May.
    14. Ian Smith, 2012. "Reinterpreting the economics of extramarital affairs," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 319-343, September.
    15. Pierre–André Chiappori & Natalia Radchenko & Bernard Salanié, 2018. "Divorce and the duality of marital payoff," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 833-858, September.
    16. Uwe Jirjahn, Cornelia Struewing, 2018. "Single Motherhood in East and West Germany: What Can Explain the Differences?," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 15(2), pages 197-229, December.
    17. Doorley, Karina & Stancanelli, Elena G. F., 2019. "Marital Status and Retirement: An Empirical Study for France," IZA Discussion Papers 12299, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    18. Edoardo Ciscato, 2019. "Matching models with and without frictions : applications to the economics of the family [Modèles d'appariement avec et sans frictions : applications à l'économie de la famille]," SciencePo Working papers tel-03411916, HAL.
    19. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Salanié, Bernard & Weiss, Yoram, 2015. "Partner Choice and the Marital College Premium: Analyzing Marital Patterns Over Several Decades," CEPR Discussion Papers 10403, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    20. Kristin J. Kleinjans & Karl Fritjof Krassel & Anthony Dukes, 2017. "Occupational Prestige and the Gender Wage Gap," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 70(4), pages 565-593, November.
    21. Jelnov, Pavel, 2023. "The marriage age U-shape," Journal of Demographic Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 89(2), pages 211-252, June.
    22. Edoardo Ciscato, 2019. "Matching models with and without frictions : applications to the economics of the family [Modèles d'appariement avec et sans frictions : applications à l'économie de la famille]," Sciences Po Economics Publications (main) tel-03411916, HAL.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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