Medical Interventions among Pregnant Women in Fee-for-Service and Managed Care Insurance: A Propensity Score Analysis
We extend prior research on the effect of managed care on the receipt of four medical interventions for pregnant women: ultrasound, induction/stimulation of birth, electronic fetal monitor, and cesarean delivery. Propensity score methods are used to account for sample selection issues regarding insurance choice. Managed care enrollees are more likely to receive an ultrasound, which may be indicative of receiving better prenatal care. Managed care plans reduce the rate of cesarean deliveries, but such limitations may be beneficial given the substantial medical evidence that cesarean deliveries are over utilized. The results indicate that insurance coverage does influence treatment intensity, but that utilization controls and provider financial incentives do not adversely affect care for pregnant women.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2005|
|Date of revision:|
|Publication status:||published in: Applied Economics, 2006, 38 (13), 1513-1525|
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