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- The Nash Bargaining Solution Under Fixed Labor Supply

Author

Listed:
  • Mª Cristina Pita Yañez

    (Universidad de Salamanca)

  • Ramón José Torregrosa Montaner

    (Universidad de Salamanca)

Abstract

Since 1950 Nash solution has been applied to solve most bargaining problems in the field of Labor Economics. In the present paper we show that this solution might not be appropriateunder uncertainty over the state of nature and a fixed labor supply due to the non-fulfilment of the concavity axiom. Desde 1950 la solución propuesta por Nash ha sido aplicada mecánicamente en la mayor parte de los problemas de negociación que se plantean en Economía Laboral. En este trabajo demostramos que la solución de Nash no debe utilizarse en aquellas situaciones en las que existe un número de trabajadores fijo e incertidumbre sobre el estado de la naturaleza debido al incumplimiento del, frecuentemente ignorado, axioma de concavidad.

Suggested Citation

  • Mª Cristina Pita Yañez & Ramón José Torregrosa Montaner, 1999. "- The Nash Bargaining Solution Under Fixed Labor Supply," Working Papers. Serie EC 1999-05, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    • Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasec:1999-05
    as

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    File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasec/wpasec-1999-05.pdf
    File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 1999
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    2. Douglas H. Blair & David L. Crawford, 1984. "Labor Union Objectives and Collective Bargaining," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 99(3), pages 547-566.
    3. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284, Elsevier.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General

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