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Transaction Costs, Fads, And Politically Motivated Misdirection In Agricultural Research

  • Wallace HUFFMAN
  • Richard E. JUST

    ()

This paper examines efficiency implications of national and local policies for fund allocation and management of agricultural research, which produce pure and impure public goods. The possibility is examined that competitive grants programs increase rent seeking activities by scientists relative to specific block grants or formula allocations and thereby reduce both the real resources available to produce traditional research outputs and the productivity with which research resources are used. Management of local research units, including advantages of incentive compatible contracts, is also considered. Additional conceptual and empirical work are needed before the issues are resolved.

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File URL: http://purl.umn.edu/18240
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Paper provided by Iowa State University Department of Economics in its series Staff Papers with number 277.

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Date of creation: Jun 1995
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Handle: RePEc:isu:isuesp:277
Contact details of provider: Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
Phone: +1 515.294.6741
Fax: +1 515.294.0221
Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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