Capital-Intensive Projects Induce More Effort Than Labor-Intensive Projects
Central governments often subsidize capital spending by local governments, instead of subsidizing operating expenses or labor-intensive projects. This paper offers one explanation, focusing on the incentive effects for local officials--a local official can more easily shift the cost of optimizing a project to his successor on a labor-intensive project than on a capital-intensive project.
|Date of creation:||Dec 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Irvine, CA 92697-3125|
Phone: (949) 824-5788
Web page: http://www.economics.uci.edu/
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John Douglas Wilson, 1990. "Are Efficiency Improvements In Government Transfer Policies Self-Defeating In Political Equilibrium?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 2(3), pages 241-258, November.
- Allan Drazen & Nuno Limão, 2004. "Government Gains from Self-Restraint: A Bargaining Theory of Inefficient Redistribution," NBER Working Papers 10375, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003.
"Bureaucrats or Politicians?,"
238, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," CESifo Working Paper Series 1130, CESifo Group Munich.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2003. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2009, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2005. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000638, David K. Levine.
- Alesina, Alberto F & Tabellini, Guido, 2004. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4252, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2004. "Bureaucrats or Politicians?," NBER Working Papers 10241, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pindyck, Robert S, 1991.
"Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 29(3), pages 1110-1148, September.
- Pindyck, Robert, 1989. "Irreversibility, uncertainty, and investment," Policy Research Working Paper Series 294, The World Bank.
- Robert S. Pindyck, 1990. "Irreversibility, Uncertainty, and Investment," NBER Working Papers 3307, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Pindyck, Robert S., 1990. "Irreversibility, uncertainty, and investment," Working papers 3137-90., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Allan Drazen & Nuno Limão, 2008. "A Bargaining Theory Of Inefficient Redistribution Policies," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 49(2), pages 621-657, May.
- Becker, Gary S & Mulligan, Casey B, 2003.
"Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government,"
Journal of Law and Economics,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 46(2), pages 293-340, October.
- Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1998. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 144, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Gary S. Becker & Casey B. Mulligan, 1998. "Deadweight Costs and the Size of Government," NBER Working Papers 6789, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Acemoglu, Daron, 2001. "Inefficient Redistribution," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 95(03), pages 649-661, September.
- Glazer, Amihai, 1989. "Politics and the Choice of Durability," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1207-1213, December.
- Coate, Stephen & Morris, Stephen, 1995. "On the Form of Transfers in Special Interests," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(6), pages 1210-1235, December.
- Avinash Dixit, 1992. "Investment and Hysteresis," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 107-132, Winter.
- K. Obeng & R. Sakano, 2000. "The Effects of Operating and Capital Subsidies on Total Factor Productivity: A Decomposition Approach," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 381-397, July.
- Brian A. Cromwell, 1989. "Capital subsidies and the infrastructure crisis: evidence from the local mass-transit industry," Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, issue Q II, pages 11-21.
- Amihai Glazer & Vesa Kanniainen, 2007. "Short-term leaders should make long-term appointments," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(1), pages 55-69, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:080913. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jennifer dos Santos)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.