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On The Economics oF Organized Crime

Author

Listed:
  • Vimal Kumar

    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

  • Stergios Skaperdas

    (Department of Economics, University of California-Irvine)

Abstract

The core function of organized crime is the selling of protection. Protection can be real, against third-party crime, or manufactured by the organized crime groups themselves. Mafias and gangs emerge in areas of weak state control, because of prohibition and geographic, ethnic, or social isolation. Although competition is considered good in economics, in the case of organized crime the predatory competition that is more likely to take place is harmful. The costs of organized crime include the resources expended on the activity, more ordinary productive and investment distortions, as well as other dynamic effects on occupational choice.

Suggested Citation

  • Vimal Kumar & Stergios Skaperdas, 2008. "On The Economics oF Organized Crime," Working Papers 070815, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:irv:wpaper:070815
    as

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    File URL: https://www.economics.uci.edu/files/docs/workingpapers/2007-08/skaperdas-15.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Syropoulos, C. & Skeperdas, S., 1993. "Gangs as Primitive States," Papers 10-93-25, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    2. Helmut Bester & Karl Wärneryd, 2006. "Conflict and the Social Contract," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 108(2), pages 231-249, July.
    3. Garoupa, Nuno, 2007. "Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 461-474, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alessio D'Amato & Massimiliano Mazzanti & Francesco Nicolli, 2011. "Waste Sustainability, Environmental Management and Mafia: Analysing Geographical and Economic Dimensions," CEIS Research Paper 213, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 24 Oct 2011.
    2. Mastrobuoni Giovanni & Patacchini Eleonora, 2012. "Organized Crime Networks: an Application of Network Analysis Techniques to the American Mafia," Review of Network Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 11(3), pages 1-43, September.
    3. Giovanni Mastrobuoni & Eleonora Patacchini, 2010. "Understanding Organized Crime Networks: Evidence Based on Federal Bureau of Narcotics Secret Files on American Mafia," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 152, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    4. Giovanni Mastrobuoni, 2013. "The Value of Connections: Evidence from the Italian-American Mafia," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 335, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
    5. J. Mark Ramseyer, 2016. "Nuclear Power and the Mob: Extortion in Japan," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(3), pages 487-515, September.
    6. Yaron Zelekha & Ohad Bar-Efrat, 2011. "Crime, Terror and Corruption and Their Effect on Private Investment in Israel," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 22(4), pages 635-648, September.
    7. Gaetano Perone, 2020. "The impact of agribusiness crimes on food prices: evidence from Italy," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 37(3), pages 877-909, October.
    8. Engelhardt Bryan, 2010. "Criminal Associations with Bargaining and Build Frictions," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 6(2), pages 303-323, December.
    9. Wallace, Rodrick & Fullilove, Robert E., 2014. "State policy and the political economy of criminal enterprise: mass incarceration and persistent organized hyperviolence in the USA," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 17-31.
    10. Cathérine Müller & Joppe de Ree, 2009. "The Threat of Terrorism: The Perspective of a Policy-Maker," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 3, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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